As a result of my recent trip to Pakistan, we reached agreement on the utilization of $100 million in Economic Support Funds which have been requested for fiscal year 1982. I might add here that throughout these negotiations we made it clear that the figures and programs were only tentative since they were still subject to review and approval by the U.S. Congress.

In order to put our current proposal in proper perspective, a brief explanation of our historical economic relationship with Pakistan may be helpful. With the creation of Pakistan as a separate Muslim nation in 1947, early U.S. assistance focused on technical assistance and disaster relief. This focus changed over time to one emphasizing the basic infrastructure required to facilitate the continued growth of this young nation. More recently, we focussed our efforts on fundamental development problems such as increased industrial and agricultural production, improved public administration, expanded social services and critical importation of raw materials and essential capital equipment. We suspended our economic assistance other than food aid in April 1979 in accordance with the provisions of the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Section 669).

Nevertheless, the Pakistani people continue to believe that a close relationship exists between our two nations. With mounting external threats to the region and to Pakistan, there is a clear opportunity for us to make this historical relationship a more meaningful one. By helping Pakistan strengthen its economy, accelerate its development progress and improve the equitable distribution of ensuing benefits, we will enable Pakistan to maintain its integrity as a nation and to stand fast against potential external threats.

Pakistan has experienced solid economic growth during the past three consecutive years with real growth averaging about 6 percent per year. Growth in the industrial sector during the past year was over 9 percent despite a comparatively poor performance in the textile subsector. Agricultural production was also strong with a growth of 4.3 percent, largely due to record sugar and wheat harvests.

The balance of payments situation, however, remains an area of major concern. The current account deficit for PFY 1980/81 was over $915 million although this was better than anticipated as a result of restrained imports, sustained growth in remittances from workers abroad and continued export growth principally in agricultural products. Ultimately, Pakistan was able to cope with the short-term balance of payments pressure following the successful negotiation of a 3-year $1.7 billion Extended Fund Facility agreement with the International Monetary Fund and at short-term debt rescheduling arrangement with the bilateral creditors in the Pakistan Donor Consortium.

The balance of payments situation in PFY 1981/82 is expected to worsen with the current account deficit increasing by $450 million to a level of $1.4 billion and the overall basic deficit expanding by $330 million to a level of $350 million. The major factors in this growing deficit are the expansion of imports by about $900 million, as a result of import liberalization policies, and slower expansion of exports, by about $400 million to a level of $3.2 billion. While workers' remittances are projected to keep pace with inflation and reach a level of $2.3 billion, this will not offset the rapid import growth. Pakistan must continue, therefore, to rely on capital inflows including resources from the IMF and concessional assistance from other donors. The proposed economic assistance program, therefore, has been developed with the following objectives: provide balance of payment support in order to help address short and intermediate foreign exchange shortfalls; address key economic problems with the objective of enabling Pakistan to achieve self-sustaining growth and improved ability to manage its debt burden; and, provide assistance compatible with IMF and IBRD programs.

The general areas of concentration for this assistance program are agricultural production, energy, population and health, tribal area development, and private sector mobilization. The greatest emphasis is on various aspects of support for continuing growth in Pakistan's key agricultural sector. In the current fiscal year, we would propose to spend approximately 80 percent of the $100 million in this area, including programs for the import of fertilizer and agricultural equipment, irrigation system improvement, and rural electrification. We also propose to resume support in the areas of population and health, including the control of malaria. New departures in our overall strategy include programs to assist in Pakistan's development of indigenous energy resources and specifically targeted development activities in the less developed and politically sensitive regions of the Northwestern Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

capability to build nuclear weapons because of a perceived threat to its national security which it believes cannot be met by conventional military and political means available to it. As praiseworthy as the intentions of the Symington amendment may have been, it is clear that it has failed to stop Pakistan from pursuing the unsafeguarded portions of its nuclear program. On the other hand, to the extent that it has kept us from helping that nation upgrade its conventional defenses, it may have added to the sense of insecurity that can only heighten pressures to achieve a capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

We believe that a program of support which provides Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant security partner and enhances its sense of security may help remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. With such a relationship in place, we are hopeful that we will be able, over time, to persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest as an important member of the world community. If we deny ourselves this relationship, however, we will forfeit the opportunity to influence future decisions. We are gratified that the U.S. Senate has taken action to modify the Symington amendment to permit assistance to Pakistan which we consider so vital.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Wheeler, will you proceed, please?

STATEMENT OF M. PETER MCPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AID, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH WHEELER, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, AID

Mr. WHEELER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McPherson plans to be here later during this hearing. He is at the moment at a meeting at the White House.

I would like to have his testimony put into the record in its entirety and just say a few words by way of summary.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. McPherson went to Pakistan in August with an economic assistance team to consult with the Pakistan Government about the nature of the program that might be developed utilizing the first $100 million proposed. That program will be primarily in the field of agriculture. Eighty percent of the first $100 million, in accordance with our preliminary thinking, will go for such items as fertilizer, irrigation, and rural electrification.

We also intend to utilize part of that first $100 million for renewal of health and population programs and smaller new programs in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier province.

I think Mr. McPherson would want to emphasize the equal partnership concept which underlies the programming that we intend to undertake. I recognize that we are at a stage where the program for the long term is still to be worked out, and it will be necessary and important for us to consult on a regular basis with the committee as we go along in the programming process.

Mr. Chairman, we would be very happy to answer specific questions about the program in the course of the hearing.

[Mr. McPherson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF M. PETER MCPHERSON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Committee to present the Administration's proposal for an economic assistance program to Pakistan. Intensive consultations during the past four months both in Washington and in Islamabad have produced an outline of a proposed assistance package which is responsive to both the anticipated Pakistani needs and U.S. Government objectives during the next 6 years.

I understand, however, that Saudi Arabia will make funds available to Pakistan for this purpose.

Questions have been raised about Pakistan's need for F–16 aircraft as opposed to a less expensive and less sophisticated aircraft. Pakistan requires an aircraft which combines contemporary technology with an affordable cost in order to upgrade its existing capabilities in the vital area of air defense. The 40 F–16's are admirably suited to serve as Pakistan's primary air defense aircraft. The aircraft can also provide close air support. Apart from a limited number of Mirage III and V aircraft from France, Pakistan's Air Force is composed largely of technologically obsolescent F–6 (Mig-19) day fighters obtained from China. (Last year safety considerations required Pakistan to phase out its Korean war-vintage U.S. F–86 aircraft). These interceptors are supplemented by only a few batteries of short range Crotale surface-to-air missiles which are of necessity used for the defense of airfields.

Given its need for a credible air defense capability to help deter or repel limited air attacks or incursions out of Afganistan, Pakistan's request for two squadrons of high performance F–16's is fully justified. Its highly competent air and ground personnel can absorb the F–16 efficiently and effectively. Furthermore, Pakistan's limited financial resources compel it to purchase a proven aircraft which will serve its needs well into the 1990's. From a U.S. strategic and operational perspective, there is an obvious advantage in having Pakistan acquire and develop the ability to support an aircraft that will be widely-deployed by the USAF beyond this decade.

We share the concerns expressed in and out of the Congress about sales of expensive, high-technology military aircraft to many countries in the developing world. The administration fully supports the sale of intermediate export fighters and we are actively encouraging friendly governments to consider this option. But we must face the fact that a friendly government, such as Pakistan, when confronted with a direct threat from the Soviet Union or a well-armed proxy, will make its own choices and buy the equipment it feels is needed for its defense. Pakistan recognizes that the aircraft it purchases now will probably have to serve as its air defense work horse for the foreseeable future, just as the F–86 served Pakistan's Air Force for about 20 years. With a current force of the Mirage and Mig-19, Pakistan requires an immediate air superiority fighter capability to face the Soviet Mig-23/25 threat.

Given the large number of Mig-25's and Jaguars that India now is expected to order, providing Pakistan with forty F–16's, the last of which is not scheduled to be delivered until late 1985, will not significantly alter the four or five to one advantage in advanced aircraft that India currently enjoys. If India purchases 150 Mirage 2000's, as recently reported, that advantage will be significantly increased.

We are very mindful of India's expressed concerns regarding our assistance proposals for Pakistan. It is our firm conclusion, however, that the projected military assistance levels and provision of the F–16's to Pakistan will not upset the overwhelming qualitative and quantitative superiority which India enjoys in the region. The U.S. program for Pakistan will not inject a new element of instability into the South Asian sub-continent. It is the Soviets, by their aggression in Afghanistan, who have brought new instability to the region and our program is designed to offset that instability. Nor will U.S. policies fuel an arms race in South Asia.

While we and India have different perceptions on several international issues including the implications of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, we wish to maintain mutually beneficial bilateral relations with the world's largest democratic nation. We have and will continue to emphasize that both countries have common objectives of stability and economic growth in the sub-continent and that our assistance to Pakistan not only is not a threat to India but does not indicate any lessening of U.S. interest in a constructive working relationship with India.

Finally, a word about the vitally important subject of nuclear proliferation. I should emphasize that this administration is firmly committed to the long-standing goals of non-proliferation expressed in legislation and by previous administrations. We believe deeply that the acquisition of nuclear explosives by non-nuclear weapons States would be contrary to the clear national interests of the United States. We have taken this vital national interest directly into account in shaping our new relationship with Pakistan. The Pakistan Government can be in no doubt about our concerns on this issue and the serious consequences which would inevitably flow from a Pakistani nuclear explosion.

Our approach to this problem, however, is based on the recognition that a nation such as Pakistan may be motivated to move toward acquisition of a

I cannot over-emphasize the importance which we attach to this new relationship. Pakistan's strategic location athwart the sea lanes to the Persian Gulf has taken on added importance with the advance of Soviet forces through Afghanistan to its very borders.

A strong, stable and independent Pakistan is an essential anchor of the entire southwest Asian region. The 430,000-man Pakistan Army is a highly professional force. Properly equipped, it has the discipline and the will to protect Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. Unfortunately, it no longer possesses the weapons required for a credible defense against the kind of equipment which the Soviets have deployed and can be expected to maintain in Afghanistan. Thus, despite the quality of its personnel, Pakistan's military forces are not equipped to defend their critical portion of the approaches to the Persian Gulf.

In assessing Pakistan's needs we have given equal weight to economic as well as military considerations. With the cooperation of the Congress, we propose to address both the economic sources of national strength and Pakistan's direct requirements for a credible military deterrent. The multi-year aspect of our undertaking underscores the comprehensive and long-term view we take of Pakistan security requirements, as well as the firm intention of the United States to prove itself a reliable and consistent partner.

In addition to our immediate request for an appropriation of $100 million in economic support funds, $600,000 in IMET and $50 million in Public Law 480 for fiscal year 1982, beginning next year we will seek a series of annual appropriations in support of a five-year program which would total about $3 billion. This would be divided approximately equally between economic assistance and foreign military sales credit guarantees. A table outlining our projected requests through fiscal year 1987 has been distributed to you. Mr. McPherson will provide details on the economic program.

Given the immediacy of the threats with which it must live, Pakistan's vital military modernization program cannot wait until October 1982 when our first FMS credits would become available. Pakistan is today under direct military and diplomatic pressure to accommodate to Soviet designs in the region. We have therefore agreed to sell Pakistan a range of urgently required military equipment for which orders must be placed in the immediate future. Items to be delivered in the near future will be paid for in cash. Formal notification of the sale of 40 F-16's has already been submitted to the Congress as have informal notification s for the sale of howitzers, TOW missiles, tanks and helicopters.

Our proposed military assistance has two objectives: to give Pakistan the ability to handle with its own resources incursions and limited cross-border threats from Soviet backed Afghan forces and to keep the Soviets from thinking they can coerce or subvert Pakistan with impunity. We fully recognize that even with our proposed assistance Pakistan cannot acquire an independent capability to confront the full wave of a direct and massive Soviet attack. Our intention is to raise the cost of potential aggression and to demonstrate that a strong security relationship exists between the United States and Pakistan which the Soviet Union must take into account in its calculations.

Of the 40 F-16 aircraft, the first six will be delivered no later than 12 months from the signing of a letter of offer and acceptance. The remaining 34 aircraft would be delivered on the basis of about five per quarter beginning 27 months following LOA signature.

We have reached agreement with the European group which co-produces F-16's whereby it will provide the U.S. Air Force with six aircraft that are surplus to current European needs, thus freeing six U.S. F-16's for transfer to Pakistan. As indicated in the formal notification to Congress of the F-16 sale, "no impact of substance on U.S. defense readiness is anticipated as a result of this sale. Full logistical support, however, will not be delivered with the first six aircraft and U.S. Air Force assets may be required for support and training during the initial part of this program." The additional 34 aircraft will come from normal production facilities of the prime contractors and will not adversely affect U.S. capabilities.

Pakistan has assured us that it has the necessary resources to meet the fiscal year 1982 costs of the F-16 program as well as for other army items which it needs on an urgent basis. In subsequent years, costs for the overall program, including the F-16's will be met by our proposed guaranteed loans supplemented by cash. Pakistan has had discussions with Saudi Arabia concerning financial assistance on the F-16's and other arms purchase. As this is essentially a bilateral matter between these two countries, I am not prepared to go into details.

tionship, however, we will forfeit the opportunity to influence future decisions.

We are gratified that the U.S. Senate has taken action to modify the Symington amendment to permit assistance to Pakistan which we consider to be so vital.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Secretary Buckley's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. BUCKLEY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to testify before your committee on our policy and assistance proposals for Pakistan. In this statement, I will outline in broad terms our policy and our military assistance proposals, including the sale of F-16 aircraft. Mr. McPherson will discuss our proposed economic assistance.

For fiscal year 1982 the administration has proposed $100 million in economic support funds and $600,000 in IMET as well as $50 million in Public Law 480. Our proposals for fiscal year 1982 are largely limited to economic assistance because Pakistan felt the need for a great deal of caution in approaching a new security relationship with the United States. The final decision to move forward with this program was not made until well after our budgetary requests for the current fiscal year had been submitted. I might point out that the assistance proposed for Pakistan did not result in an increase in fiscal year 1982 budget outlays because the $100 million was shifted to the foreign affairs account from the national defense account. We are pleased that the Senate Appropriations Committee has specifically approved this assistance in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations bill.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan has found itself thrust into the unwelcome status of a frontline state subject to all the hazards that have been the common experience of other countries which find themselves in the same neighborhood with the Soviet Union or its proxies. Pakistan had the option of succumbing to pressures to accept the status quo or resisting them. Pakistan elected to condemn the occupation of Afghanistan, and has accepted our help in bolstering its defenses even though this could increase the near term threat of retaliation.

Given these potential risks and the rocky history of the past relationship between our two countries, the Pakistan Government wanted to satisfy itself as to the existence of a public consensus in support of the arms sale and economic support package which we proposed. This it did through a series of well-publicized and widely-reported hearings and debates in which the advantages and risks of a new relationship with the United States were fully explored. In the meantime, over a period of several months, representatives of our two governments engaged in frequent, intensive, and highly fruitful discussions focused on a common concern over Soviet expansionism and its implications for regional security.

Through its refusal, in the face of Soviet pressures, to accept the legitimacy of the puppet regime in Kabul, Pakistan has demonstrated an admirable willingness to stand by principle and assume the considerable risks of Soviet displeasure. But the Pakistanis have taken an even more decisive step. The joint statement released following my visit to Islamabad last June represented a courageous decision on their part to embark on a qualitatively new relationship with the United States which involved the risk of increased Soviet hostility and pressure, including military attack by proxy forces. This action signaled a new confidence which Pakistan places in the reliability of the United States and the willingness of the Congress and the American people to defend their national interests abroad by offering support to nations willing to assume the risk of their own defense.

Our relationship is based on the principle of sovereign equality. The United States has expressly recognized Pakistan's non-aligned status and the respected position it occupies in the Islamic community of nations. As had the previous administration, we have reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 bilateral agreement, and Pakistan has expressed its satisfaction with the commitment conveyed therein. We have made no additional commitments beyond those relating to the programs we are discussing here today. We have one overriding purpose, and that is to work together to create a stronger, more self-reliant Pakistan as it confronts Soviet power in neighboring Afghanistan.

Pakistan recognizes that the aircraft it purchases now probably will have to serve as its air defense workhorse for the foreseeable future, just as the Korean war-vintage F–86 served Pakistan's air force for about 20 years.

Pakistan requires an immediate air superiority fighter capability to face the Soviet Mig-23 and Mig-25 threat. We are very mindful of India's expressed concerns regarding our assistance proposals for Pakistan. It is our firm conclusion, however, that the projected military assistance levels and the provision of the F–16's to Pakistan will not upset the overwhelming qualitative and quantitative superiority which India enjoys in the region and will continue to enjoy even after the delivery of our F–16's.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that their superiority in terms of defense aircraft is in the range of 4 or 5 to 1 and that the ratio is bound to enlarge when aircraft currently under order by India are delivered.

The United States program for Pakistan will not inject a new element of instability into the South Asian subcontinent. It is the Soviets by their aggression in Afghanistan who have brought a new instability to the region which our program is designed to offset.

Finally, a word about the vitally important subject of nuclear proliferation. I should emphasize that this administration is current committed to the longstanding goals of nonproliferation expressed in legislation and by previous administrations.

We believe deeply that the acquisition of nuclear explosives by nonnuclear weapons states would be contrary to the clear national interest of the United States. We have taken this vital national interest directly into account in shaping our new relationship with Pakistan.

The Pakistan Government can be in no doubt whatever about our concerns on this issue and the serious consequences which would inevitably flow from a Pakistani nuclear explosion.

Our approach to this problem, however, is based on the recognition that a nation such as Pakistan may be motivated to move toward acquisition of a capability to build nuclear weapons because of a perceived threat to its national security which it believes cannot be met by conventional military and political means available to it.

As praiseworthy as the intentions of the Symington amendment may have been, it is clear that it has failed to stop Pakistan from pursuing the unsafeguarded portions of its nuclear program. On the other hand, to the extent that it has kept us from helping that nation upgrade its conventional defenses, it may have added to the sense of insecurity that can only heighten pressures to achieve a capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

We believe that a program of support which provides Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant security partner and enhances its sense of security may help remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

With such a relationship in place we are hopeful that over time we will be able to persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest as an important member of the world community. If we deny our rela-

Our proposed military assistance has two objectives. First, to give Pakistan the ability to handle *with its own* resources incursions and limited cross-border threats from Soviet-backed Afghan forces, and to keep the Soviets from thinking they can coerce or subvert Pakistan *with* impunity.

We fully recognize that even *with* our proposed assistance Pakistan cannot acquire an independent capability to confront the full wave of a direct and massive Soviet attack. Our intention is to raise the cost of potential aggression and to demonstrate that a strong security relationship exists between the United States and Pakistan which the Soviet Union must take into account in its calculations.

Of the 40 F–16 aircraft, the first 6, which will become available from our production because an equal number can be made available to us from surplus European stocks, will be delivered no later than 12 months from the signing of a letter of offer and acceptance. The remaining 34 aircraft would be delivered on the basis of about 5 per quarter beginning 27 months following the signing of an LOA.

As indicated in the formal notification to Congress, no impact of substance on U.S. defense readiness is anticipated as a result of this sale. The additional 34 aircraft will come from normal production facilities of the prime contractors and will not adversely affect U.S. capabilities.

Pakistan has assured us that it has the necessary resources to meet the fiscal year 1982 costs of the F–16 program, as well as for other army items which it needs on an urgent basis.

In subsequent years costs for the overall program, including the F–16's, will be met by our proposed guaranteed loans supplemented by cash. Questions have been asked about Pakistan's need for F–16 aircraft as opposed to a less expensive and less sophisticated aircraft.

Pakistan requires an aircraft which combines contemporary technology *with* an affordable cost in order to upgrade its existing capabilities in the vital area of air defense. The 40 F–16's we propose to sell are admirably suited to serve as its primary air defense aircraft. Apart from a limited number of Mirage-III and V aircraft from France, Pakistan's air force is composed largely of technologically obsolescent F–6 day fighters obtained from China, which is their version of the Mig-19. These interceptors are supplemented by only a few batteries of short-range Crotale surface-to-air missiles which are of necessity used for the defense of air fields.

Given its need for a credible air defense capability to deter or repel air attacks, Pakistan's request for two squadrons of high performance F–16's is fully justified. Its highly competent air and ground personnel can absorb the F–16 efficiently and effectively. Furthermore, Pakistan's limited financial resources compel it to purchase a proven aircraft which will serve its needs well into the 1990's.

We share the concerns expressed in and out of the Congress about the sale of expensive, high technology military aircraft to many countries in the developing world. The administration fully supports the sale of intermediate export fighters, and we are actively encouraging friendly governments to consider this option. But we must face the fact that *when* confronted *with* a direct threat from the Soviet Union or a well-armed proxy, a particular country will make its own choices and request the equipment it feels it needs for its defense.

reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 bilateral agreement, and Pakistan has expressed its satisfaction with the commitment contained therein.

We have made no additional commitments beyond those relating to the programs we are discussing today. We have one overriding purpose, and that is to work together to create a stronger, more self-reliant Pakistan as it confronts Soviet power in neighboring Afghanistan.

Given its strategic location athwart the sea lanes to the Persian Gulf, a strong, stable and independent Pakistan is an essential anchor of the entire Southwest Asian region. The 430,000-man Pakistan Army is a highly professional force. Properly equipped, it has the discipline and the will to protect Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity.

Unfortunately, it no longer possesses the weapons required for a credible defense against the kind of equipment that the Soviets have deployed and can be expected to maintain in Afghanistan.

In assessing Pakistan's needs we have given equal weight to economic as well as military considerations. In addition to our immediate request for an appropriation of $100 million in economic support funds [ESF], $600,000 in international military education training [IMET], and $50 million in Public Law 480 for fiscal year 1982, beginning next year we will seek a series of annual appropriations in support of a 5-year program which would total about $3 billion. This would be divided approximately equally between economic assistance and foreign military sales credit guarantees.

A table outlining our projected requests through fiscal year 1987 has been distributed to members of the committee. Mr. Wheeler will provide details on the economic program.

PROJECTED ADMINISTRATION REQUESTS FOR PAKISTAN, FISCAL YEARS 1982–87

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	Development assistance	Economic ESF fund	Public Law 480, title I	FMS credits	IMET training	Total
Fiscal year:						
1982		$100	$50		$0.6	$150.6
1983	$75	125	50	$275	.8	525.8
1984	100	125	50	300	.8	575.8
1985	125	125	50	325	1.0	626.0
1986	150	125	50	325	1.0	651.0
1987	150	125	50	325	1.0	651.0
Total military programs						1,555.2
Total economic programs						1,625.0

Given the immediacy of the threats with which it must live, Pakistan's vital military modernization program cannot wait until October 1982 when our first foreign military sales [FMS] credits would become available.

Pakistan is under direct military and diplomatic pressure to accommodate to Soviet designs in the region. We have, therefore, agreed to sell Pakistan a range of urgently required military equipment for which orders must be placed in the immediate future.

Items to be delivered in the near future will be paid for in cash. Formal notification of the sale of 40 F–16's has been submitted to the Congress, as have informal notifications for the sale of howitzers, TOW missiles, tanks, and helicopters.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. BUCKLEY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY PHILIP R. MAYHEW, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ARCHELAUS R. TURRENTINE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS CONTROL, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I may, I will give you a somewhat abbreviated version of my testimony, and I ask that the full text be inserted into the minutes of the meeting.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Without objection it will be inserted in the record following your oral remarks.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to discuss the administration's policy and assistance proposals for Pakistan. In my statement I will outline in broad terms our policy and our military assistance proposals, including the sale of F–16 aircraft.

Mr. Wheeler, who is the Deputy Administrator for AID, will discuss our proposed economic assistance. Our proposals for fiscal 1982 are largely limited to economic assistance because Pakistan felt the need for a great deal of caution in approaching a new security relationship with the United States. The final decision to move forward with this program was not made until well after our budgetary request for the current fiscal year had been submitted.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan has found itself thrust into the unwelcome status of a frontline state subject to all the hazards that have been the common experience of other countries which find themselves in the same neighborhood with the Soviet Union or its proxies.

Pakistan had the option of succumbing to pressures to accept the Soviet-imposed status quo or resisting them. Pakistan elected to condemn the occupation of Afghanistan and has decided to accept our offer of help in bolstering its defenses.

Given the rocky history of the past relationship between our two countries, the Pakistan Government wanted first to satisfy itself as to the existence of a public consensus in support of the arms sale and economic support package which we proposed. This it did through a series of well-publicized and widely reported hearings and debates in which the advantages and risks of a new relationship with the United States were fully explored.

In the meantime over a period of several months representatives of our two countries engaged in frequent, intensive and highly fruitful discussions focused on a common concern over Soviet expansionism and its implications for regional security.

Our proposed relationship is based on the principle of sovereign equality. The United States has expressly recognized Pakistan's nonaligned status and the respected position it occupies in the Islamic community of nations. As had the previous administration, we have

AID AND THE PROPOSED ARMS SALES OF F-16's TO PAKISTAN

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1981

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. S. I. Hayakawa presiding.

Present: Senators Hayakawa, Boschwitz, Pell, and Glenn.

Senator BOSCHWITZ [presiding]. This morning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hear testimony from administration witnesses concerning the emerging security relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

Last week the CIA conducted a detailed briefing for the committee on this subject. Today's hearing is intended to cover all aspects of the new United States-Pakistani relationship, including the 6-year, $3.2 billion assistance program that is proposed for Pakistan.

On November 10, Senators Hatfield and Moynihan introduced a resolution of disapproval against the sale of the 40 F–16's to Pakistan. The Foreign Relations Committee has 10 days from that date to report on that resolution.

I would hope that today's witnesses would focus on the following basic issues related to this proposed F–16 sale. One, Pakistan's need for advanced fighters to deter attack from either the Soviet Union or India; second, the domestic political situation in Pakistan and the impact of such a sale on that situation; third, I hope you will deal with what you perceive to be the objections of Senator Hatfield and Senator Moynihan with respect to the sale of these F–16's. Fourth, the status of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and the U.S. efforts to restrain or control or have some impact on that program. Fifth, the impact of this sale on the regional military balance in South Asia. Sixth, the impact of the proposed F–16 sale on United States-Indian relationships. And finally, the Pakistani's ability to finance the F–16 sale without harming that country's plans for economic development or other military procurement.

We are honored today to have Secretary Buckley with us once again. We have also Philip Maybew, Deputy Director of the Near East-South Asian Affairs, International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense; Archelaus Turrentine, Deputy Assistant Director of the Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Joseph Wheeler, Deputy Administrator of AID.

I understand Senator Hatfield may join us and may wish to testify as the hearing progresses.

Secretary Buckley.

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(II)

AID AND THE PROPOSED ARMS SALES OF F-16's TO PAKISTAN

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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How does that agency view the sale of F–16's to Pakistan?

Mr. TURRENTINE. Mr. Chairman, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency participated in the executive branch review of the sale.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TURRENTINE. We concur in that position.

Senator HAYAKAWA. You do concur in it?

Mr. TURRENTINE. Yes, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. You have no reservations about the United States making this sale?

Mr. TURRENTINE. No, sir; we do not. We gave careful consideration to the balance in the area, and we do not feel that it will distort the balance in any way.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Is there an arms race going on in the Asian subcontinent? Should we help feed this arms race?

Mr. TURRENTINE. I would not characterize what is going on as an arms race as such. I think that our primary objective here is to help build the self-confidence of the Pakistanis in dealing with their own security; that is our objective.

Senator HAYAKAWA. How much of this assistance is for the sake of preserving internal order as opposed to deterring attacks from other nations?

PRIMARY PURPOSE OF ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE

Mr. TURRENTINE. Well, the primary purpose of the enhancement package for Pakistan is to give them confidence that they can deter external aggression, which also gives them a sense of self-confidence.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I find your answers about the point of view of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency quite reassuring.

Excuse me for a moment.

[Pause.]

Senator HAYAKAWA. Senator Pell, would you kindly take the chairmanship for a few minutes? I have some more questions to ask, but there is a gentleman waiting for me whom I must meet with immediately.

Thank you very much, Mr. Turrentine.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Mr. Turrentine, I would like to follow up that point you just mentioned, that this sale will not upset the arms balance in the area. I recognize that the Indian capacity is superior to Pakistan in arms total supply; but is not one inevitable result of this sale will be the purchase by India of some compensating form of aircraft?

INDIA'S DECISION TO PURCHASE AIRCRAFT

Mr. TURRENTINE. Senator Pell, I believe that the Indians have already made decisions to purchase aircraft prior to the conclusion of this sale. I think that the Indians enjoy such a quantitative and qualitative edge over the Pakistanis that this particular sale should in no way threaten the Indians.

Senator PELL. What type of airplanes do you think the Indians have made a decision to buy?

Mr. TURRENTINE. The Indians are looking at additional Jaguar aircraft in addition to looking at the Mirage-2000.

Senator GLENN. Would it be the policy of the administration that if the Pakistanis use the F–16's in a cross-border raid and initiate that raid for preemptive strikes of any kind across into India that that would be misuse of this equipment, and all aid and further programs would terminate?

Mr. BUCKLEY. If it were an offensive raid——

Senator GLENN. No, that was not the question.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Then one would have to examine what the circumstances were to determine if it were defensive or offensive.

DETERMINE WHAT IS DEFENSIVE

Senator GLENN. I am saying that if the same definition of defensive use was made, the same type rationale was used by Pakistan as was used by Israel and Pakistan went across on preemptive strikes claiming they were defensive in nature, crossed over into India in any way for strikes of that kind, would the program terminate?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I say we would have to make the determination of what is defensive.

Senator GLENN. If they crossed over a border and attacked another nation that had not attacked them first, how could it be anything but offensive?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I can imagine situations, and I am sure you can, too, in which such an act would be clearly defensive.

Senator GLENN. OK. My time is more than up, and I appreciate the chairman granting me this additional time, but I did want to get these points made.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

We have some other questions here which I think I would like to undertake.

Mr. Mayhew, what exactly are Pakistan's military needs? Given the threats from the Soviets in Afghanistan, would not army equipment and antiaircraft equipment be a more cost effective military procurement option for Pakistan? I mean why F–16's as opposed to all the other possibilities.

Mr. MAYHEW. Mr. Chairman, I think the answer to that is that Pakistan has needs not only for aircraft but for a whole range of army equipment as well. As you know, we have sent up informal notifications on several items—howitzers, TOW's, helicopters, tanks—and there will be further army items.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So this is just part of the overall preparedness on the part of Pakistan.

F–16'S PART OF LARGER PROGRAM

Mr. MAYHEW. Yes. The F–16's are part of a larger program which we would expect to be funding—to be assisting over a number of years. We would not, of course, provide the entire funding for all the Pakistani procurement.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

I wonder if I could ask some similar questions to Mr. Turentine, who is in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

tional alinement along the Indian border is still there, very little change. And so I wonder whether they really see their main threat coming from India or from the Soviets in Afghanistan, because they have not realined their armed forces to reflect very much concern about what may come out of Afghanistan.

Mr. BUCKLEY. No. 1, the topography and existing infrastructure is along the plains facing India. No. 2, you have a few Indian divisions deployed there, and normal prudence would require you to deploy your forces. No. 3, there have been adjustments made in terms of command, the communications and so forth in the interior provinces. Some roadbuilding is now in progress which is designed to help the military infrastructure. And there are, in terms of forces, the frontier guards which roughly offset the forces on the other side.

But where you come to equipment that would cope with air attack, the Pakistanis are badly lacking. In other words, what I am saying, is that the kind of equipment that we are talking about is appropriate to the threat that does, in fact, exist and that has manifested itself in periodic raids.

Senator GLENN. Let me run through very briefly some of the logic of this. In your prepared testimony you give two objectives of our proposed military assistance. One was to let Pakistan have its own resources for handling incursions, limit cross-country border threats from Soviet-backed Afghan forces; and two, to keep the Soviets from thinking they can coerce or subvert Pakistan with impunity.

And yet, Pakistan's traditional main concern has been India, not the other direction. This is sort of a new-found concern over on the Afghan border.

Mr. BUCKLEY. It is a newly created concern. It is a newly created concern resulting from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN'S INSECURITY

Senator GLENN. Well, certainly Pakistan's longstanding insecurity, which we are trying to help them address, is one that traditionally has been more oriented toward India than it has been toward Afghanistan, which comes back again to the question of whether we can get any understanding on offensive and defensive uses of this equipment.

The F–16 because of its prior use now has a tremendous reputation as an attack weapon around the world. Do you plan any discussions with the Pakistanis to try and define offensive and defensive use of the equipment to a better extent than there is now?

Mr. BUCKLEY. As we have been talking, Senator, I have been trying to think how one would define the situation. I think our intentions are clear; they are clearly understood. It is clearly understood that we are advancing this relationship because of common concerns to the north and because it is in our interest to see Pakistan capable of maintaining its territorial integrity.

The geopolitical situation shifts rather dramatically when Russia moves into Afghanistan, when you can start conjuring up the creation, through subversion, of the People's Republic of Baluchistan.

But I would hope that you would carry through on this; that if there is an explosion in either country that there would be an immediate cutoff of all aid, and that would terminate.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I fully understand and appreciate your concerns, Senator, and we have of course discussed these a number of times over the past 7 or 8 months. But I would just reiterate that, No. 1, nobody does or has questioned the fact that the Pakistan Government over a period of years has been working as rapidly as it has been able toward developing the capacity for a nuclear option.

HELP PAKISTAN FEEL MORE SECURE

No. 2, the Symington amendment has not slowed that down one bit. No. 3, there is a chance that if we help Pakistan feel more secure, that we undercut the basic incentive for developing this option. And No. 4, we develop through this relationship at least forces to delay an explosion, and delay buys time in which to exercise the powers of persuasion and to help persuade the Pakistani Government that it is in nobody's interest or specifically its own to do such an act.

Senator GLENN. That we help Pakistan feel more secure from what source?

Mr. BUCKLEY. The north, Afghanistan.

Senator GLENN. The Soviets?

Mr. BUCKLEY. From the limited kind of attack and incursion that is quite possible today, tomorrow, next week out of Afghanistan. They are not going to stop a major——

Senator GLENN. Is it your impression that the Pakistanis feel more threatened by the Soviets than they do by India?

Mr. BUCKLEY. There are two levels of threat, Senator. Given the history of the fighting that has occurred, given the huge forces that each country has along the common boundary, of course they fear one another. By the same token, if you are talking about the reality of incursions out of Afghanistan, that is very, very real, and Pakistan today has very little to resist that with.

Senator GLENN. In your prepared statement you say, "But we must face the fact that a friendly government such as Pakistan when confronted with a direct threat from the Soviet Union or a well-armed proxy," what nation do you refer to there?

Who is the well-armed proxy?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, Afghanistan, the Afghans.

Senator GLENN. You were not referring to India?

Mr. BUCKLEY. No. I would not consider Indira Ghandi anyone's proxy.

Senator GLENN. I believe there are probably more arms flowing into India at the moment from the Soviet Union than are probably in existence in Afghanistan.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Without a doubt; yes.

MAIN THREAT FROM INDIA OR SOVIETS

Senator GLENN. I checked not long ago the alinement of military forces in Pakistan when we were preparing for some of this floor debate. And while the exact specific positions are classified, the tradi-

realize the importance of the sales from other standpoints. But *when we were* cooperating *with* them, they *went* ahead *with* their bomb plans. *When we* cut off sales in April of 1979 they *went* ahead *with* their bomb plans. A .l they have given no assurances that they are not going right ahead *with* their nuclear explosive plans. An explosive is the same. It just depends on where you set the thing off, whether it is a peaceful one or a *warmaking* one.

So I *would* hope that *what* you have said this morning is carried out as far as a cutoff goes in the event of an explosion, because I am afraid that these *two* countries that have had a continual semi-*warfare* situation going for many years, are going to engage in a big nuclear arms race.

"BOMB: THE ONLY ANSWER"

Here is the front page of the Sunday supplement of the Times of India, April 26 of this year, *with* the title here, "Bomb: The Only Answer." The little caption or summary of the *whole* thing says:

"Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons will have grave and irreversible consequences for the subcontinent, and India will respond in an appropriate manner to any such development," said the Prime Minister in Lok Sabha earlier this month.

That's the Prime Minister of India—

The stage has now been set for intensive debate on the issue of whether this country should prepare itself to exercise its nuclear option.

This article is by Mr. K. Subramanyam, Director, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis. And so this is the Sunday Review of the Times of India. The bomb is the only answer, as India sees it—not a PNE *now*, but a bomb, a nuclear *warfare* bomb—if Pakistan goes ahead and develops a nuclear explosive capability.

So I think *we* may enter into another nuclear *weapons* race type situation, that you are as concerned about as I am; I know that from all of our conversations about this many times in the past.

But *we* have to make it very clear—and your statements go almost that far this morning at least—in saying that *we will* have a cutoff if there is an explosion. The amendment that I have put through on the Senate floor made it equally applicable to Pakistan or India, *which* ever one goes ahead *with* this option.

I would say, too, just in a related field here that I think time is running out on us unless *we* can get the SALT talks going again. Otherwise the argument that *we* are running a *two*-track system, that *we* are trying on one hand to get SALT, to get control of the big powers' nuclear *weapons* programs at the same time *we* are asking the other nations not to develop a bomb capability *while we* try and get control of this bigger problem, and eventually work all nations into this same type agreement, that that argument won't hold much *water when we* are saying no, *we want* to build bigger stockpiles here before *we* are willing to get back to SALT again. And so *we* give other nations a lot of ammunition for going ahead *with* their own program of nuclear *weapons* development unless *we* can at least get something going again in the SALT talks.

Senator GLENN. Well, that's true across the board in any law we pass. We can't always foresee the circumstances of everything we pass or every statement we've made.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That's why we question the——

Senator GLENN. As Mr. Stockman is finding out. You have to be careful with these things. You can't tell what the consequences of all these actions will be in every way. And that is what we have been trying to spell out so there can be no doubt about what our intention is, that we view this most seriously.

Mr. BUCKLEY. But, you know, the executive branch typically rejects handcuffs on Presidents projected way into the future.

Senator GLENN. Some of these sales are not covered by my amendment specifically, so if Pakistan detonates a nuclear device before completion of the F–16 sale, will the administration cut off future deliveries?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Again, Senator, we have underscored the fact that this would dramatically affect the relationship. The cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.

Senator GLENN. Let me go back just a little.

In 1966 Prime Minister Bhutto, in speaking about whether India was going to be able to make bombs or not, said that if India did make nuclear explosives or nuclear weapons, Pakistan would "eat grass," in order to do the same thing.

PAKISTAN EFFORT TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR PLANTS

In 1972 Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was reported initiated in a meeting between Bhutto and key Pakistani scientists in Multan, and for over 5 years now Pakistan has been engaged in a worldwide, clandestine effort to obtain materials and equipment to construct nuclear enrichment plants and reprocessing plants, of which they need neither for their power system. They only have, as I recall, a 137-megawatt reactor. So there obviously is only one reason for the path that they have embarked on by the obtaining of reprocessing or enriching equipment. They just do not have a legitimate role in the present nuclear program in Pakistan.

In 1979 the United States officially declared that the purpose of Pakistan's enrichment plant was "related to an effort to develop a nuclear explosive capability." In August of this year the Director General informed the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] board of governors that in the absence of upgraded safeguards, the agency could no longer give assurance that plutonium-bearing spent fuel has not been illegally diverted from reactors. In response to this Pakistan has refused to allow additional safeguards on its reactors. The State Department has reported, at least in press accounts, to have obtained information that Pakistan is working on nuclear explosive triggering devices, and there is a preparation of a test site that has been commented on in the papers. And President Zia has refused to provide assurance that they will refrain from detonating nuclear explosives.

It just seems to me if we go ahead with these sales, the argument that we will have more influence over them is questionable, and I

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think there is no doubt whatsoever in the minds of any responsible official in Pakistan, including the President, as to the consequences of exploding a nuclear device, and the fact that we do not draw a distinction between so-called peaceful nuclear explosions and weapons.

Senator GLENN. OK. Tell me what those consequences would be? That was in your statement. Would you define what those consequences would be?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Given the premises of our relationship, it would be very hard to see how after an explosion we could go forward with assistance programs.

Senator GLENN. Would we cut off as the amendment provides, would we terminate all aid and military assistance if they explode?

Mr. BUCKLEY. If the amendment is in fact in force, of course we will, that is the law.

Senator GLENN. Let me look for your exact wording. Your statement says, "Our concerns on this issue and the serious consequences which inevitably would flow from a Pakistani nuclear explosion."

My amendment is not yet law. It has only passed the Senate. You are stating that there would be serious consequences which inevitably would flow from a Pakistani nuclear explosion, and this is a statement by the administration, so what would be those serious consequences absent my amendment? Suppose it does not pass the House, what would the administration do?

Mr. BUCKLEY. As I stated, given the premises of our relationship, it is hard to believe that assistance would go forward.

I would say this. I am sure that the Pakistan Government would fully anticipate an explosion is going to be followed——

Senator GLENN. Well, if assistance is not going to go forward, that's saying that we would cut assistance off, is that right?

Mr. BUCKLEY. That would be certainly what one would anticipate.

Senator GLENN. Is that the policy of the administration now, that if they explode we will cut off assistance?

Mr. BUCKLEY. The policy of the administration has been defined by the President in a statement in July, saying that this would have most serious consequences. We have left, I think, no doubt in the mind of the Pakistan leadership what those consequences would be. I don't believe anyone in Pakistan expects that assistance would continue in the aftermath of an explosion.

Senator GLENN. I find it difficult to understand, then, if it's your understanding that we would cut off, as I interpret what you just said, and it's the understanding in Pakistan that aid would be cut off if they set off a nuclear explosion, why did the administration oppose my amendment so vigorously, if that's what we're going to do anyway?

Mr. BUCKLEY. There is an inherent question of prudence involved in any executive capacity as to dealing in absolutes when you don't know of future circumstances. It is not focused on this particular situation. It is endemic of the executive branch.

We have had indications from other people that these things were discussed in other meetings, but I found it incredible that the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel after the raid on Iraq and after the raid on Beirut sat for two lengthy meetings and never even discussed this matter of the use of American equipment in that way.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That matter was discussed on a subsequent day.

Senator GLENN. I'm sorry?

Mr. BUCKLEY. My understanding is that matter was discussed the next day. Things have a way of being programed.

Senator GLENN. Well, that was not our understanding. In fact, Prime Minister Begin made the flat statement that he was surprised it did not come up. It just seems to me that if we are going to sell more F–16's in that part of the world, and there has already been press speculation as to whether India will attempt to take out Pakistan's nuclear facilities or vice versa when Pakistan gets the capability, shouldn't we have a better definition than we have had on past sales for offensive and defensive uses of this equipment?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Senator, I believe in most situations it is rather clear. If you are talking about a preemptive strike and labeling it as defense, you have a situation, given the huge advantages which India enjoys today and will continue to enjoy irrespective of the sale of F–16's, that frankly, it would be suicidal for Pakistan to make such a strike.

AGREEMENTS GOVERNING SALE

Senator GLENN. It might be, but I am concerned that the agreements governing the sale of our weapons systems are interpreted to mean the recipient can fly almost anywhere and make any strike that they wish to make in the name of defense before somebody else does it to them.

I would think we would want to get a much better definition of this than we apparently have. Let me move to another subject.

You are aware, no doubt, that in the Senate just a couple of weeks ago my amendment passed on the cutoff of any assistance to Pakistan or India in the event of a nuclear explosion. It did not say nuclear weapon; it said nuclear explosion. That passed in the Senate on a rollcall vote. It indicated the seriousness with which we approach this subject.

Even though the committee gave a waiver on the Symington amendment in this case and even though action has not been taken on the Senate floor, any further contact with Pakistan—any further efforts to try to get the Pakistanis to agree to no explosions of any kind?

Mr. BUCKLEY. We have had continuing conversations on the whole area of our concerns on nuclear nonproliferation. I think I can say categorically, Senator, that there is no doubt whatsoever in the minds of the officials of Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan, the President of Pakistan as to the consequences of an explosion.

Senator GLENN. I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

Mr. BUCKLEY. The daughter continues to be confined. All I can say, Senator, is that it is in the nature of private diplomacy, if it is to be effective, to be private.

Senator PELL. I hope that either through quiet or public diplomacy that poor young woman can be released from her present solitary confinement.

One of the problems about conditions in Pakistan is that if any of the people are too explicit, they themselves are liable to end up back in jail. That is why it is hard to be as informative as I would like.

MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH OPPOSITION

In this regard, what is our policy with regard to maintaining contact with the opposition? Do we maintain contact with the opposition in Pakistan?

Mr. BUCKLEY. It is the normal function of the diplomatic post to maintain contact with all factors in a society, and I have no reason to believe that will not continue.

Senator PELL. In this regard, members of the staff of our committee traveled to Pakistan a couple of months ago and met a good many of the opposition leaders. Many of these leaders stated to the staff that they opposed the F–16 sale and assistance but did not want to go public on it because they did not want to have the same fate as awaited Ms. Bhutto. And this information was relayed to the State Department. I am sure you are aware of it yourself.

So the purpose of my question here is to try to bring a little emphasis to this question of human rights which I hope will be cranked into whatever arrangement you finally agree on with regard to aid to Pakistan.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Glenn, do you have any questions?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEFINITION ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE USES

Mr. Secretary, on the matter of F–16's and the other equipment that will be sent to Pakistan, do we have a definition that they have accepted on the offensive and defensive uses of that equipment?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I don't think we have gone into an attempt to go beyond what the clear meaning of those words is. I understand there are some situations where that is less clear, but they are under no misapprehensions as to the fact that we sell weapons for defensive use only.

Senator GLENN. We sold F–16's for defensive purposes to Israel, too, of course, and the interpretation of what is offensive and what is defensive use of that equipment was stretched to the breaking point in most Americans' minds. We now are about to sell F–16's to Pakistan.

In a meeting with this committee which did get out into the press later even though it was a closed meeting, it turned out in our discussions with Prime Minister Begin when he was here that the matter of offensive and defensive uses of equipment never even came up in his own personal conversations with the President.

Senator PELL. Your own report, the State Department's own report on country human rights practices, says here that "Restrictions on dissent and individual freedoms have grown during the past year while citizens' rights have diminished." I am quoting from your report. That would indicate a direction opposite from what you suggest.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I believe that report is some months old, but we will look into it.

Senator PELL. It is dated February 1981.

RESTORATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

Also concerning human rights, I would be interested in your position and the administration's position on my amendment which was approved by the Senate. It says:

In authorizing assistance to Pakistan it is the intent of Congress to promote the expeditious restoration of full civil liberties and representative government in Pakistan.

I wonder if you have a view with regard to this amendment. What do you think might be done to implement it?

Mr. BUCKLEY. One of the things that I think is clear is that anything that enhances a country's feeling of security, basic security, enhances an atmosphere wherein the kinds of reform of which you speak can be better effectuated. So we believe that the kind of relationship that we are talking about, which would enhance the sense of security given the threat that now exists out of Afghanistan, that helps the development of the economy of the country to have better capability to handle basic human needs will in turn, in combination with quiet diplomacy, enable us to be most effective in advancing our ideals.

PRESIDENT ZIA CONDUCTING VENDETTA

Senator PELL. Let me be very specific and talk about the Bhutto family for a moment. It appears as if President Zia is conducting a vendetta against the widow and daughter of executed—murdered—former Prime Minister Bhutto. Mrs. Bhutto has spent 26 of the last 41 months in detention without charges being brought. During the summer her daughter Benazir was confined in an unventilated cell under appalling conditions. She continues to be held without trial or charges being brought.

I am wondering if the administration has made any representation to the Government of Pakistan about the confinement and maltreatment of the Bhutto family? Will the administration use the leverage gained from our new relationship to perhaps work for the release of these ladies? I certainly would hope that we could use some influence with Zia on this matter, because while he has executed the husband and the father of these women, I would think that he would not keep the widow and the daughter confined under the conditions that he does.

Mr. BUCKLEY. My understanding is that the widow no longer is confined.

Senator PELL. You are right. As I said in my statement, she has spent 26 months confined out of the last 41, but she has been released now. The daughter is still in jail.

Memories certainly at this end of the avenue are fairly short, and we forget sometimes the fact that the last Indo-Pakistan war was fought almost entirely with American contributed weapons.

During the consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act I was responsible for an amendment, which was accepted, to make the restoration of democracy and respect for fundamental human rights important American objectives in Pakistan. I believe this emphasis on human rights should be continued.

I applaud the State Department's policy memorandum of October 27 with regard to human rights. I am delighted they are filling the job of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and am delighted that they intend to have an evenhanded approach to human rights.

I have written the Secretary saying what an excellent memorandum I thought this was, but now I would like to see it applied, to have some of the fallout from that memorandum enter into our relationship with Pakistan.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN PAKISTAN

In that regard I was wondering if you were familiar with the testimony of Amnesty International which believes that the human rights violations in Pakistan amount to a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. Do you feel that they are correct?

What would be your view with regard to Amnesty International's conclusions, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. BUCKLEY. First of all, Senator Pell, I would like to reiterate what I said before you came in; and that is that I very respectfully disagree with your analysis that our proposed military sales are viewed in Pakistan as support for the Zia regime in contrast to support of the defense needs of the nation of Pakistan.

As I mentioned to the chairman, three members of the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee recently asked the question of leaders of various factions, various political factions in Pakistan, including opponents of the Zia regime. They found a broad consensus in support of the sale of F–16's specifically.

With respect to our human rights concerns, I am delighted that you received our memorandum. It is a serious memorandum and expresses a serious purpose. Perhaps what will distinguish this administration from the last one is that we believe we can move most effectively in terms of private diplomacy, of discussions where one can be most persuasive. We intend to pursue those kinds of discussions everywhere this problem arises.

I must confess that I am not familiar with the Amnesty International report itself, but when I go back to my office I certainly shall look it up.

We did see a series of arrests in the wake of the hijacking of the Pakistan international airliner which was accompanied by the assassination of a Pakistani diplomat. Most of the people then arrested have been released. It frankly is our assessment, subject to reviewing this evidence to which you point, that conditions are better today than they were under the prior democratically elected regime.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Do the F–16's provide Pakistan with a delivery system for nuclear devices?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, they would. But by the same token, that is not the only aircraft that would have that capability. My understanding is that the Mirage III currently possessed by Pakistan, would have the capability of delivering a small nuclear device.

Senator HAYAKAWA. If the sale is approved, will this sour our relationships with India?

Mr. BUCKLEY. India certainly has voiced very strong objections to the sale, there is no doubt about it. But by the same token, the United States must look at the needs of both nations, of all nations on the subcontinent. And again, in assessing the impact of our proposed sale, which is modest in scale, on the existing balance of forces, quite clearly we are not introducing anything that would present a threat to India because of its clear preponderance in military force.

We are very anxious to maintain the best possible relationships with India and have taken every occasion and are continuing to take occasion to emphasize that.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Is there not a high degree of tension between the governments of President Zia and Prime Minister Ghandi?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Tensions exist. There is no doubt about it.

Senator HAYAKAWA. There have been minor border clashes, have there not?

Mr. BUCKLEY. They are minor, and I guess they have been continuing for some time and probably will continue in the future. By the same token, the Zia government has made proposals for demilitarization. There was a meeting earlier in the year when the Indian foreign minister visited Islamabad to try to lay the groundwork for continued further normalization of tensions and relationships between the two countries. We hope very much that will continue.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is very good to be with the Secretary and his colleagues. I have a brief statement that I will make within my 10-minute framework.

Our hearing today is the beginning of the Foreign Relations Committee's examination of our proposed new relationship with Pakistan. I must say that I have serious reservations about several parts of the administration's proposed new relationship with Pakistan, particularly in the military area.

Our assistance is widely seen in Pakistan as American support for a pretty brutal military dictatorship, and for this reason, American assistance has been heavily opposed, as the Secretary knows better than I do, by a great many Pakistanis, including the leadership of the most popular political party in that nation, the Pakistan People's Party.

The sale of the F–16's will escalate a subcontinent arms race which is draining billions of dollars from desperately needed economic development in India and Pakistan. To my mind the F–16 is inappropriate for Pakistan's defense requirements.

Given the history of India and Pakistan conflict, I think we will all agree that the F–16's are more likely to be used against India than against the Soviet Union or Afghanistan. The F–15 also is the most visible symbol of American support for the Zia regime.

Senator HAYAKAWA [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Wheeler.
Senator Glenn, do you have any questions?
Senator GLENN. Why don't you go ahead, Mr. Chairman? I, too, just arrived.
Senator HAYAKAWA. Let me pause for a moment to see where we are in the course of this hearing.
[Pause.]
Senator HAYAKAWA. I have some questions here that I want to ask.

F–16's NEEDED AS DETERRENT

Does the administration believe that Pakistan wants F–16's to deter the Soviets in Afghanistan or to deter India which presently has purchased hundreds of advanced fighter aircraft?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think quite clearly, Mr. Chairman, it is the former. That is where a new element of threat has appeared. There have been raids across the Afghan-Pakistan border. There have been enormous diplomatic and other pressures exerted.

With respect to India, India has an absolutely clear superiority in advanced aircraft, and the addition of 40 aircraft to Pakistani stock will not upset that superiority.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is a very clear answer. India then really is that much superior in air strength?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, it is. India has large quantities of advanced Soviet and English aircraft on order. They will be delivered over the next few years. Just this morning there is a story out of Reuters that the Indians may be concluding an additional purchase, this time with France, for 150 Mirage-2000 aircraft, the most highly advanced aircraft that the French have developed.

Senator HAYAKAWA. There are factions in Pakistan that are opposed to President Zia. Will they feel that these sales are to support Zia or to support Pakistan as a whole?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think quite clearly the consensus, the very broad consensus in Pakistan is that what we propose is in support of the nation, its national security and economic needs.

There are two interesting factors, Mr. Chairman. The Zia government, as I reflected in my testimony, is very conscious of the need for popular support in this particular area and conducted a series of town hall meetings, you might say, reported by live television and radio in which the arguments were developed. It proceeded after it was satisfied as to the existence of the consensus.

More recently, three members of the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee went to Pakistan and interviewed people in every segment of the political and economic life of Pakistan. They came back with that same conclusion, that this represents a national consensus—not the support of a regime but the support of a nation.

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Senator HAYAKAWA. Good. What kind of assurances did you get about Pakistan's nuclear program?

Mr. BUCKLEY. President Zia repeated what he has stated on previous occasions, and that is that the government has no intention of developing nuclear weapons.

In that regard we plan to give special emphasis to reducing illicit narcotics cultivation in the Northwestern Frontier Province by stimulating broader development opportunities. The Bureau for International Narcotics Matters of the State Department recently sent a team of technical experts including a representative from AID to identify possible integrated area development projects that could maximize local employment opportunities. This is the key factor in the management of the opium production problem. A report is in final preparation which has identified the Malakand Agency as a possible site for this new undertaking. The Government of Pakistan shares our commitment to eliminating opium production, and has indicated full cooperation in this effort. The Bureau for International Narcotics Matters will also work to stimulate vigorous enforcement by the Government in areas that are clearly accessible to the Pakistani law enforcement authorities.

A table outlining our proposed utilization of these funds in fiscal year 1982 and the outyears is attached to my statement. You should of course understand that our projections for fiscal year 1983 and beyond are at this point notional. They will be adjusted with experience and subject to the close scrutiny of the Congress on an annual basis.

During my August 1981 consultations in Pakistan, I had the opportunity to meet with high government officials including President Zia ul Haq and Minister of Finance Ghulam Ishaq Khan as well as with Pakistani lawyers, businessmen and educators. I visited Afghan refugee camps and talked to a number of farmers and artisans. I was struck by the interest evidenced in a renewed economic assistance relationship and by the frankness and responsiveness on the part of all Pakistanis. I believe this is a unique opportunity for this Administration to reshape its historic relationship with Pakistan. We must remember that the Pakistanis are a proud people, fiercely independent and determined to pursue their own course as an Islamic nation. I believe we must establish this relationship on the basis of equal partnership with the mutual interest in Pakistan's independence and continuing economic development.

Mr. Chairman, we are all concerned in the economic stability of Pakistan in order to enable it to withstand the mounting threats in the region. The program which the Administration is proposing is vital to the security and political interests of the United States. This program is directly responsive to key economic constraints which face Pakistan today. We hope that the Congress will share the Administration's policies with respect to Pakistan and will support this new relationship by lifting the Symington Amendment restrictions and funding the proposed fiscal year 1982 ESF program. I stand ready to consult with the Committee on a continuing basis as the specifics of the Pakistan program are worked out between our respective governments.

PROPOSED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PAKISTAN

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

Proposed use	Fiscal year— 1982	1982–87
Agricultural inputs	60	300
Fertilizer	(50)	(250)
Agricultural machinery	(10)	(50)
Agricultural production, distribution, and storage	0	100
Farm to market roads	0	50
Energy development	5	200
Water management	15	100
On-farm water management	(7)	(10)
Irrigation canal rehabilitation, antiwaterlogging and salinity programs	(8)	(90)
Agricultural education, research, and extension	0	50
Population and health	10	75
Population and rural health	(6)	
Malaria program	(4)	
Private sector mobilization fund	0	50
Baluchistan project fund	0	30
Tribal areas project fund	5	15
General training	1	5
Project design fund	4	10
Project reserve	0	340
Subtotal	100	1,325
Public Law 480, title I/III	50	300
Total	150	1,625

police inside the perimeter wall had positioned themselves between the main entrance gate and the entrance to the chancery. As the mob approached, the police retreated to the area near the chancery flag pole which is directly in front of the lobby. They attempted to stall the advance of the mob by firing warning shots in the air. Almost immediately, there was return fire from the area near the front gate. None of the policemen were wounded but they were quickly overrun and their weapons taken by the mob.

At that time, the Administrative Counselor, Dave Fields, directed floor wardens to inform all mission employees to move to the Safehaven area located on the third floor. Initially those on the ground and second floors collected in the corridors of the second floor behind the public access control barriers. Shortly thereafter, they were directed to the third floor vault area. At approximately 1315 the NCOIC, Master Gunnery Sergeant Miller, conducted an inspection of the MSG defensive positions. He checked Post two, which was outside the cafeteria at the ground floor entrance, and then went to Post four and six on the roof. Post six was at the southwest corner of the roof overlooking the auditorium. Post four was at the southeast corner of the roof overlooking the motor pool area. Both MSGs assigned to these posts had their emergency equipment; including flack jackets, steel helmets, gas masks, mace, service revolver, 12-guage shot guns and emergency kits with gas grenades and launchers, and extra ammunition. The MSG internal defense force was not equipped with hand held VHF radio communications as had been specified in the internal defense plan. Radios were on order but had not been received.

As the NCOIC arrived on the roof, he noted that Post six, Corporal Crowley, was propped up against a sixteen inch verticle wall that surrounded the entire outside of the chancery roof area. Sporadic weapons fire continued, apparently coming from the front entrance of the compound. After checking Post four, the NCOIC advised the Marine to secure the Post and augment the internal defense force on the lower floors of the chancery. Turning to Post six, approximately 40 yards away, the NCOIC immediately recognized that Corporal Crowley had been injured. A quick examination indicated he had been shot through the head. The bullet had entered the temple near his left eye below the helmet line and exited the rear of the head behind his left ear above the helmet line, passing through the helmet. The NCOIC first attempted to render first aid by stopping the massive bleeding, and then Corporal Crowley was removed from the roof to the third floor and later to the vault area. Mrs. Fields, the Embassy Nurse, attended to his wound and kept him alive for more than three hours through the use of oxygen units maintained in the vault. At approximately 1525, when the last of the oxygen was exhausted, Corporal Crowley died.

The mob, after overpowering the police in the very early stages of the attack, had free run of the compound. They began throwing rocks and flower pots through the ground floor windows and then attempted to remove the decorative iron grill work. The first penetration of the chancery occurred at approximately 1340 through the ground floor cafeteria windows after the grill work was pulled away. Shortly thereafter they removed the grill work from the remaining windows in both the southeast and northwest ground floor courtyards. Just prior to the initial penetration of the chancery, the NCOIC had ordered MSG Post two to secure and report to the second floor lobby area. As Corporal Parry, the MSG at post two secured the area and moved toward the cafeteria staircase, he was confronted by the first group of attackers, who had broken into the cafeteria and were moving into the hallway between the cafeteria and Post two.

Corporal Parry, armed with a shotgun and other emergency protective equipment, confronted the demonstrators, who retreated from the hallway area back into the cafeteria allowing Parry to proceed down the hallway and up the stairs. On reaching the second floor, Parry threw several tear gas grenades down the stairwell and secured the fire door between the ground floor and second floor lobby area. The time was approximately 1345.

At the chancery entrance, the mob threw rocks and sticks and debris through the outer grill gate breaking and smashing the glass on the front door. Flammable materials were stacked between the grill gate and front door and ignited. Despite their concerted effort, they were unable to break through the protective iron grill gate. The RSO, NCOIC, several Marines, and two DEA agents remained behind the Marine control booth and public access barriers observing the mob and throwing tear gas grenades into the lobby and down the stairwells to the ground floor area. The use of tear gas effectively delayed the attackers from penetrating the second floor lobby area from either the ground floor level or from the main lobby entrance.

During the morning, leaflets were passed out on the campus of Quaid-E-Azam University identifying the U.S. as an enemy of Islam. Between 1200 and 1230, rightist and leftist student leaders began addressing groups on the university grounds, urging them to gather weapons and attack the U.S. Embassy. The Mujaat-Islami, a rightist group, assembled some 35 male students on buses and drove toward the American Embassy. On the same morning, a number of Palestinian students on the university campus were also encouraging attacks against the Embassy.

Shortly before 1225 hours, two busloads of students from Quaid-E-Azam University drove to the USAID/USIS complex, which is several miles from the Embassy, where they stopped and requested directions to the United States Embassy. The AID Administrative Officer immediately called the Embassy and advised that a group of students in buses were on their way to the Embassy compound and that their arrival was imminent. At about the same time, Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., United States Ambassador to Pakistan, enroute to his residence from the chancery, observed the buses of university students heading toward the Embassy. As soon as he arrived at his residence, he telephoned the Embassy to alert the security and administrative staff. Upon receipt of the warning, the initial phase of the internal defense plan was implemented and at approximately 1226, recall was sounded for the Marine Security Guard Detachment.

At approximately the same time, the FSN security assistant telephoned police Assistant Sub-Inspector Nawaz, who was in charge of the police detachment on the Embassy compound, alerting him to the arrival of the students. Nawaz was temporarily housed at the servant's quarters located approximately 200 feet from the chancery building. As soon as the alert was received, the contract guards were instructed to deny access to the compound to all persons. At approximately 1235, two buses of students stopped at the front perimeter gate entrance. The students disembarked chanting anti-U.S. slogans, carrying placards, and throwing rocks at the front gate and guard booth. The small force of three to five policemen outside the entrance were eventually successful in talking the group into returning to the buses and departing the area, heading back toward Quaid-E-Azam University. This demonstration lasted little more than five minutes and the only damage was to the windows of the guard booth at the entrance.

Marine Posts one and two at the front lobby and side entrance were manned and the remaining off-duty Marines, who had immediately responded to recall, were placed on standby in the chancery lobby. A few minutes later, a new group of buses appeared heading toward the Embassy from the direction of the University. The Marines, who had already donned their emergency gear, were deployed to their internal defense posts. Posts four and six took up their assigned observation posts on the roof of the chancery. Post three assisted Post two in reinforcing the ground floor entrance.

THE ATTACK

The second group of buses, numbering eight to twelve and crammed with some 500 students, arrived at the front gate at approximately 1300 hours. They were immediately confronted by a small contingent (half dozen) armed police stationed directly outside the main entrance gate and a similar number of police inside the gate. The mood of the demonstrators was substantially different from that of the first group. This was no longer a controlled demonstration with chanting, rock-throwing and general harassment; it was an hysterical, frenzied, irrational group clearly intending violence. Immediately upon disembarking from the buses, they swarmed to the perimeter walls, overpowering the police and taking their weapons. An FSN in an ICA vehicle who had driven up to the main gate to enter the compound was ordered from his vehicle by the mob and the vehicle was set on fire. Members of the mob climbed on the roofs of the buses and the shoulders of other demonstrators and scaled the exterior perimeter wall. They were chanting, screaming and throwing rocks at the policemen inside the compound. At approximately 1315, the attackers began jumping off the wall and entering the compound, commencing a full scale attack against the compound. Some of the attackers were armed with sticks, pipes, rocks and other weapons including rifles and handguns; however, the majority of the mob had no firearms.

Immediately upon entering the compound, the attackers moved east of the chancery toward the motor pool and the American Club. Private and official vehicles parked in those areas were quickly set afire. The small contingent of

The main and seconda- entrances were controlled by MSG posts. Post one controlled the chancery lobby on the second floor. Post two controlled the entrance to the ground floor from the southeast side of the chancery. MSG post one was located in a ballistically hardened booth while post two was located in a partially armored booth. Plans for completing the armoring of post two had been approved by the Department but the implementation of those modifications was pending receipt of materials. Access doors leading from the lobby to the Consular Section and to the main corridors of the building were reinforced with one-eighth inch boiler plate steel and secured with Brute Master Locks electronically controlled by MSG post one. The chancery ground floor front windows were protected with decorative iron grills. A main central stairwell and stairwells at both ends of the building led to the upper floors. Hollow core wood doors prevented access from the second floor to the third floor. An elevator was located in the center of the building which could be remotely shut off by MSG post one. The PCC vault area was secured by a Mosler Class 6 vault door and was located on the third floor, southeast corner of the chancery building.

From the perspective of public access controls at other embassies, the security arrangement at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad was well above average. Lobby public access controls were properly designed to perform the intended function of preventing penetration of the building by a small armed group of terrorists. However, in other areas of access control, e.g., ground floor window grills and secondary entrances, the controls and physical barriers were not sufficient in scope or design to prevent forced penetration by a large and determined mob, particularly in view of the lack of a prompt or meaningful response by the host government.

PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES

In light of the heightened security sensitivity due to the situation in Iran, as well as the previous demonstrations in Lahore and Karachi, the Embassy had sought explicit assurances from the GOP that it was willing and able to defend the Embassy from attacks or violent demonstrations. During the week of November 12–16, Andy Koritko, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) and his FSN security assistant met with Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sheratzal, who was responsible for the protection of all foreign missions in Islamabad, and subsequently with Sheratzal's superior, Mohammed Ali. The RSO was informed that the police would and could handle any threat directed to the U.S. Embassy. Furthermore, he was informed that the additional 22-man police detail assigned to the Embassy was in response to the situation in Iran, and if a demonstration or attack were to occur the police were prepared to use tear gas, lathi (riot control batons) and weapons, as necessary. Their instructions were to put down any demonstration. The police on the compound were to serve as an initial response force that could be quickly reinforced as necessary. Emergency phone numbers for contacting the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other officials were provided to the RSO with the assurance that an English speaking Pakistani officer would always be available to monitor any request for assistance. The Embassy also undertook measures to further increase its security. During the week before the attack the Marine Security Detachment conducted internal defense drills to improve its state of readiness. The Security Watch Committee met and reviewed the situation including internal defense arrangements and emergency and evacuation plans. The Embassy compound access procedures were reviewed and tightened to provide more positive control of persons entering and leaving the compound.

PRELUDE TO THE ATTACK

On Wednesday morning, November 21, rumors began spreading in Pakistan that an armed group had seized the Haram Mosque in Mecca at the direction of U.S. and Zionist forces. Reportedly a radio newscast started the rumor but despite an intense effort we have not been able to identify such a broadcast. In any event, no newscast clarifying or denying the early report was broadcast until that evening when President Zia went on television to calm the population and explain that no foreigners were involved in the mosque attack. Pakistanis throughout the country apparently accepted that allegation of foreign involvement at face value and in many areas they closed shops, stopped work and took to the streets in both peaceful and violent demonstrations. The most violent demonstrations took place in Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Islamabad.

On November 16, some 50 Iranian students gathered in front of the Iranian Cultural Center, which is located several blocks from the Consulate, Karachi. Part of this group proceeded to the area adjacent to the Consul General's residence. The police prevented them from gaining access to that area and they returned to the Iranian Cultural Center. After some delay, the same group set out in the direction of the Consulate building displaying large photos of Ayatollah Khomeni and placards stating "Down with Carter," "Down with the Shah," "Down with Sadat." Before traveling the short distance to the Consulate, they were stopped by the police and given two minutes to disperse. When they refused, the police subdued them by use of force and took them to the local police station where they were detained pending investigation. On November 16, the American Embassy, Islamabad received a report that a demonstration was planned for that date at the Embassy's front gate. The assumption was that the demonstration would involve Iranians and be related to the situation in Tehran. No demonstration materialized.

On November 19, 100 to 200 students held a demonstration a short distance from the ICA American Center in Lahore. The majority of the demonstrators were apparently Arab students and exhibited strong pro-Khomeini, anti-U.S. feelings. The GOP appeared aware of the planned demonstration and had taken appropriate security measures in the area. During the week prior to the events of November 21, students at Quaid-E-Azam University in Islamabad had been participating in a student week organized by the student union.

American Embassy, Pakistan—Compound Layout

The American Embassy in Pakistan is located on a 31-acre site in the diplomatic enclave of Islamabad. This new capital city is built on a selected site near the older Cantonment Town of Rawalpindi. Islamabad consists principally of government offices, foreign diplomatic missions, and residential area for senior government officials and employees of foreign missions. Islamabad is a well-planned city with broad avenues and wide streets. The Canadian residential compound is directly across the street from the American Embassy, and the British Embassy is approximately a quarter of a mile away. The Foreign Ministry of Pakistan is approximately a five-minute drive from the U.S. Embassy.

The Embassy compound included a chancery building, two staff apartment complexes, Marine quarters, servants quarters, an American Club and a recreation area consisting of a swimming pool, tennis courts and a small golf driving range. It also housed a large CSO complex, warehouses and a motor pool. To the north side of the compound was the yet uncompleted Ambassador's residence. The rear of the compound was enclosed by a tenfoot cyclone fence and the front and sides were enclosed by brick/masonry walls ranging in height from nine to eighteen feet. There were four entrances to the compound: the main vehicular and pedestrian gate, located 75 yards to the front of the chancery entrance; a pedestrian gate leading to the American Club; a pedestrian gate leading to the servant's quarters, and a vehicle gate at the southeast end of the compound. The latter was permanently secured. All entrances to the compound were controlled by members of the Embassy Contract Guard force. In addition, the main gate, the American Club entrance, and the servant's quarters entrance were manned by Pakistan National Police Officers. Normally a contingent of nine police officers were assigned to the Embassy compound. However, as a result of reports received by the GOP indicating the possibility of hostile action against the Embassy, the police complement had been increased to thirty-one officers.

The extremely large area of the compound ruled out the establishment of strong exterior defensive perimeters; therefore, the chancery building was the local point for the Embassy's internal defense efforts. The chancery was a large three-story brick and masonry building with five entrances that had been barricaded to prevent forced entry:

(1) The front or main entrance was secured by wood and glass double doors and protected on the exterior by a twelve foot iron bar gate and on the interior by an iron bar gate remotely controlled from within.

(2) The secondary entrance was located on the ground floor adjacent to the motorpool area and secured by solid core wood double doors.

(3) An emergency exit was located on the ground floor at the northwest end of the chancery and secured by a hollow core wood door.

(4) The ground floor front court and entrance was secured by hollow core wood doors augmented with a heavy iron gate on the interior side.

(5) There was also an entrance from the roof that was protected by a hollow core wood door.

Security Detachment was shot and killed while manning his post on the roof of the chancery.

The safehaven located in the Post Combined Communication (PCC) vault area was never penetrated despite the determined efforts of the mob to force open the escape hatch leading from the vault to the roof. One hundred and thirty six Americans, Pakistani FSNs and one Time Magazine correspondent remained in the vault area for approximately 4½ hours while the Embassy burned and the attackers maintained control of the compound. At approximately 1800 hours an armed team of Marine Security Guards (MSGs) supported by two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents were deployed to gain access to the roof, clear it of attackers, and force open the jammed escape hatch to the Embassy roof. This was accomplished without hostile resistance as the attackers had vacated the roof.

At approximately 1830 hours, the FSNs and American employees escaped to the roof from the vault via the emergency escape hatch. Pakistani military authorities, who had established control of the compound by approximately 1800 hours, assisted the employees in descending to the ground. They escorted the Americans to the British Embassy located a short distance from the chancery.

In addition to those employees taking refuge in the Embassy vault, a small group of Americans were caught by the incident at the Embassy Club/restaurant. This group, consisting of approximately sixteen people, represented a mix of government employees, private business personnel, and other Western nationalities. The group was protected by a small force of PNP and later military who formed a ring around the personnel. This group was subjected to considerable verbal abuse and rough handling by the mob which numbered in the hundreds. Although no severe physical harm was done to any of the people in this second contingent, they suffered a harrowing four hour ordeal until the police were able to negotiate them through the crowd and into an army truck which took them to a Pakistani army camp for the night.

The total fatalities included one U.S. Marine, who was killed by hostile weapons fire; one U.S. Army Warrant Officer, whose burned body was discovered a day later in the staff apartments; two FSNs, who had been burned to death on the ground floor of the chancery; and one demonstrator who was shot and killed by the Pakistani police during the attack. There have also been unconfirmed reports of another death among the demonstrators. The chancery compound was completely destroyed with the exception of the partially constructed Ambassador's residence.

During the entire period of the attack, from approximately 1235 to 1800 hours, the United States Ambassador to Pakistan, the Deputy Chief of Mission and the British, Canadian and West German Ambassadors had been in constant contact with Pakistani Government officials at the highest level in an effort to obtain a relief force. Their efforts were consistently met with assurances from the Government of Pakistan (GOP) that adequate protection would be forthcoming. However, it was not until 1800 hours, some six hours after the first call for help, that the Pakistani military obtained meaningful control of the chancery compound. Prior to this, the mob had, of its own accord, begun to break off the attack and leave the Embassy grounds.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE NOVEMBER 21 ATTACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD

Although there had been demonstration activity against U.S. installations in Pakistan during the summer of 1979, there had been no violent incidents, and the activity was apparently unrelated to the situation in Iran. On August 15, 50–75 students demonstrated in front of the American Consulate General (Consulate), Lahore. On August 17, there was a demonstration in front of the American Consulate, Karachi and on August 21, a demonstration in front of the International Communications Agency (ICA) American Center, Hyderabad. All of these demonstrations were pro-Arab, staged to protest alleged American imperialism, Zionism, the U.S. role in the Israeli/Egyptian peace process, as well as an alleged U.S. military threat in the Middle East.

After November 4, the day of the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the tempo of the demonstrations changed. Subsequent demonstrations had, for the most part, pro-Iranian, anti-U.S. overtones. In mid-November, intelligence indicated that groups of Iranian students, as well as Arab and left-wing Pakistanis were planning anti-American demonstrations during Moharram, the eleven-day Muslim period of mourning scheduled to start on or about November 20 and end on or about December 1.

Question 11. What have been the costs of assembling and presenting the claims?

Answer. It is not possible to arrive at a dollar figure for the costs of assembling and presenting the claims. These actions were undertaken by Department of State personnel as part of their regular duties.

Question 12. What additional security measures have been taken to protect U.S. personnel and property in Pakistan? What have been the costs of these additional measures and who has paid for them?

Answer. A large number of security measures have been taken by both the Pakistani and the U.S. Governments in the last 2 years. The Government of Pakistan has provided 24-hour coverage of the Embassy Chancery by 25 military personnel. The parent unit of this contingent is situated approximately 1 mile from the Embassy. The unit's major function is to respond to requests for assistance from diplomatic missions in Islamabad.

The host government has also provided military personnel support to our Embassy and Consulates upon request for special assistance, including security arrangements for Under Secretary Buckley's visit last spring, increased protection during demonstrations in front of our building, and additional precautions during periods of heightened security measures at our posts throughout the Middle East and South Asia regions.

The U.S. Government constantly reviews its emergency planning procedures and equipment. A number of physical security projects were carried out in Pakistan in late 1979 and early 1980. The Department of State conducted a comprehensive security survey at our Embassy and Consulates to review existing programs and identify areas for improvement of both physical and personnel safety. Some of the survey's recommendations have been implemented; others are being incorporated into the design and reconstruction of the Embassy Chancery.

Measures taken by the Government of Pakistan, such as detail of military personnel to U.S. Government installations have been paid for by that government. Measures planned for and implemented by the State Department have been paid for by the U.S. Government.

It is extremely difficult to determine the actual cost of these security measures. Some measures recommended in the security survey would have been implemented regardless of the events of November 21, 1979, because of heightened security concerns world-wide. Funds of $2.1 million were committed for our Embassy and Consulates in Pakistan during fiscal year 1981. Figures for 1982 expenditures are not yet determined, pending findings of architectural and engineering studies for physical projects.

After Action Report—Attack on the American Embassy, Islamabad, November 21, 1979

Synopsis

On November 21, 1979, between 1200 and 1300 hours, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad was attacked by a group of Pakistani students. This attack was quickly followed by a larger attack involving over 500 Pakistanis. During the afternoon, mob violence grew until a total of 5,000 to 10,000 persons were involved in a violent demonstration against the U.S. Embassy. At the onset of the demonstration, the Pakistan National Police (PNP) and local Foreign Service National Contract Guards were quickly overpowered and the Embassy compound was overrun. However, the combination of public access controls, the use of tear gas and a dedicated internal defense force delayed the advance of the attackers sufficiently for mission employees within the Chancery to be evacuated to the safehaven area. Other facilities on the compound, e.g., the American Club, staff apartments, motorpool, and Marine quarters were overrun, vandalized, and set on fire. A small group of Americans and foreign service nationals (FSNS) unable to gain access to the chancery, and initially accosted by the mob were protected by a small contingent of PNP Officers. Later in the day, the PNP assisted the group in escaping from the compound to sanctuary at the British Embassy.

The chancery was initially penetrated through the ground floor level when decorative grill windows were removed from the cafeteria and other areas. Although the attackers were delayed by the use of tear gas, they eventually overran the remainder of the ground, second and third floors of the building. The entire building was set on fire. Despite the fact there was no direct contact between the Embassy's internal defense team and the attackers, one member of the Marine

Two, the deployment of Pakistani security forces guarding President Zia, who happened to be touring Rawalpindi, about 15 miles from the capital, on November 21; and

Three, the apparent breakdown in command and communications with the security forces and among the security forces.

There was never any question as to the Pakistan Government's acceptance of its full responsibility to provide protection or subsequently of its deep regret that it failed to fulfill these responsibilities. The Pakistan Government immediately offered full compensation. Measures have been taken to prevent a recurrence."

Question 6. In orchestrating the attack, the attackers were able to recruit a mob in Rawalpindi, transport the mob in government-owned buses unimpeded to the American Embassy in Islamabad, more than 20 miles away, and carry out the assault for 5 hours without interference. Given the logistics involved, can you explain the success of the attack in any way other than—

(a) The attack was carried with the complicity or at least acquiescence of the Pakistan Government or

(b) The Zia government was so weak that it could not control a mob in its capital?

Answer. As observed in the response to question 5 above, the extreme slowness of the Pakistani Government's reaction appears to have been the result of the complete unexpectedness of the attack, the lack of contingency planning for such an event and the distraction of security forces, and a breakdown of command and communications procedures.

Question 7. Has the Government of Pakistan paid in full for all damage done to U.S. Government property and the property of U.S. citizens in Pakistan on November 21, 1979? If not, what damage has the Government of Pakistan not paid for?

Answer. The Government of Pakistan has paid the United States Government $13,940,709 for the cost of rebuilding the destroyed Embassy compound and payment for reconstruction of the American Center in Lahore. The balance of the claim for $7,244,877 which covers claims for furnishings, vehicles, equipment, personal property and othe items is under active discussion with the Government of Pakistan. We anticipate an early settlement.

Question 8. Has the Government of Pakistan paid compensation for the American lives lost in the attack and if so, how much? Did the U.S. Government ask for compensation for the lives lost, and if not, why not?

Answer. The U.S. Government has not considered it appropriate to ask the Government of Pakistan to pay compensation for the American lives lost in the attack, nor are we aware of any precedent for doing so.

Question 9. What was the cost of evacuating dependents of U.S. Government officials from Pakistan? Why was the evacuation decision at least indirectly a consequence of the Embassy attack? If so, why shouldn't the Pakistani Government pay for the cost of the evacuation?

Answer. The cost of evacuating dependents of U.S. Government officials from Pakistan was approximately $1.3 million.

The decision to evacuate dependents of U.S. Government personnel was based on a general assessment of the security situation in the region as a whole in the immediate aftermath of the episode at the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the attack on the Embassy. It was carried out in Pakistan as well as in a number of other countries as a temporary measure during a period of heightened regional tension. The decision to evacuate personnel and dependents was made unilaterally by the United States Government, without any reference to the Pakistani Government. There is, in general, no reference for seeking remuneration for such expenses.

Question 10. When was the bill for damages submitted to the Pakistan Government? How long has the bill been before the Government of Pakistan? Are there any items for which the Pakistani Government has refused to accept, or sought to modify, our claim? If so, for which items? Why has it taken so long for the Pakistani Government to pay up?

Answer. Claims were submitted by diplomatic note on December 19, 1979 and in another note of December 18, 1980. There was disagreement over the amount to be reimbursed for reconstruction of our facilities to be paid in dollars as compared to reimbursement in local currency. This disagreement was resolved. Continuing discussions concern reimbursement for furnishings and other such items.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I myself have to be elsewhere in a minute or two. Senator Hatfield was to appear this morning to testify on his resolution of disapproval. However, he was unable to make it this morning, and we will try to reschedule it. We will keep the record open for 48 hours for additional questions.

I thank all of you gentlemen for coming here today to testify. I found your answers to questions very helpful.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. What steps has the Government of Pakistan taken to identify, prosecute, and punish the persons responsible for the attack on the American Embassy November 21, 1979? Is the Government of Pakistan capable of identifying the attackers and the organizers? Does the U.S. Government know the identities of the attackers or organizers?

Answer. On June 19, 1980, the Department informed the Congress: "Legal proceedings were initiated against a number of individuals who were arrested by the police during or immediately after the incident of November 21. The legal proceedings against the persons referred to are handicapped by lack of evidence. After initial hearings these persons were able to secure their release on bail granted by the courts in accordance with provisions of law, but these cases are still pending in the courts."

We have requested from the Government of Pakistan updated information concerning the prosecution of these individuals. We are currently awaiting a response to this request which will be transmitted to the Committee.

Question 2. Does any person known to have been involved in the attack now hold any position in the Pakistani Government or any agency associated with it?

Answer. As explained in the response to the previous question, detailed information on the identity of the attackers is limited. To date there is no evidence to suggest that any of the attackers held or currently holds a position in the Pakistani Government.

Question 3. Did the Pakistani Government—or anyone in the Pakistani Government—have any involvement in any respect of the attack? Did the Pakistani Government—or anyone in the Pakistani Government—have foreknowledge of the attack?

Answer. The circumstances of the mob attack were reported to the Congress in 1980 as indicated below. No additional information has become available since that time.

"While the compound in Islamabad was in flames, a smaller mob attacked our Consulate General in Lahore, inflicting significant damage but with no serious injuries. The American Center in Rawalpindi was set on fire and destroyed. Anti-American demonstrations also occurred in Peshawar and Karachi, but Pakistani security forces were able to prevent them from approaching our offices in those cities.

We believe these events were essentially spontaneous in nature. There is no convincing evidence of a countrywide conspiracy, although there may have been some element of advance planning on the part of student groups on several campuses for demonstrations in that rough timeframe."

Question 4. Did President Zia have any foreknowledge of the attack?

Answer. We do not believe he did.

Question 5. Why did it take the Government of Pakistan more than 5 hours to respond to American calls for help at the U.S. Embassy? Does the Pakistani delay indicate that Zia did not feel sufficiently secure to move against the Islamic attackers? If so, what does that suggest about the strength of his regime?

Answer. The Department addressed this question in the 1980 hearings as follows:

"Both we and the Pakistan Government remain deeply concerned by the slowness of the response of Pakistani security forces. There appear to have been a number of factors which contributed to this, but do not excuse it. These include: One, the lack of warning, as well as the inadequacy of preparation for an incident of such unprecedented magnitude in a normally tranquil capital thought to be immune to such mob violence. There was no precedent of mob action in Islamabad and adequate security forces were not in place or readily available;

Senator HAYAKAWA. Secretary Buckley, what security commitment has the United States Government made to the Government of Pakistan? In the past, U.S. officials have contended that the 1959 executive agreement was sufficient assurance of U.S. assistance in time of crisis; but the Pakistanis wanted a more explicit commitment.

Did the administration give a more explicit commitment to the Government of Pakistan, and under current circumstances does the 1959 agreement extend to an attack on Pakistan, for example, by India?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. Chairman, we have explicitly reconfirmed the undertakings.

Senator HAYAKAWA. It has been reconfirmed.

Mr. BUCKLEY. In the 1959 agreement. And the understanding that this applies only to aggression by a Communist state.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I see.

BASIS OF PAKISTAN'S ECONOMY

Mr. McPherson, what is the basis besides remittances that you spoke of earlier, what is the basis of Pakistan's economy? What is their basic source of wealth?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Largely agriculture. Some 64 percent of their GNP is agricultural production. An important development in their agriculture sector has been an increase in wheat from about 7½ million tons per year to an excess of 12 million tons over a relatively few years. That was in response to agriculture prices being increased for the farmer.

In addition, there is an industrial sector that is growing, but it starts from a relatively small base. The Punjab area which stretches from Pakistan down into India is a land of substantial agriculture or at least wealth and potential wealth.

Senator HAYAKAWA. OK.

Is Pakistan an exporter of wheat?

Mr. MCPHERSON. No, they are not.

But they were a substantial importer. However, this increase in production as a result of price increases to the farmer was a key—was an important part. One of the items that they have imported substantially is vegetable oils, and our aid program as designed will be directed toward increasing domestic vegetable oil production. That is about a $300 million per year import bill and growing.

U.S. ABSTENTION ON INDIAN LOAN

Senator HAYAKAWA. What was the reason, Mr. McPherson, for the U.S. abstention on the $5.8 billion IMF [International Monetary Fund] loan to India? Did we oppose it for technical reasons related to IMF or for political reasons related to India?

Mr. MCPHERSON. No, sir. We were concerned as to the tightness of the terms, the conditions which were given, and we were also concerned about the other countries in competition for those funds. Because we had those concerns we decided to abstain. There are other parties within the Government that no doubt can speak very knowledgeably about this as well, Treasury and others.

billion. In addition, a few months ago the United States and others entered into an agreement to defer part of the debt repayment for an 18-month period. There has been some question about whether that might be extended, but at this time we do not expect to do so.

We expect in the next few years that the percentage of debt will raise from something like 13 percent to 14 to 15 percent. But in any case, the overall burden does not seem to be one that would be impossible to handle. Part of the way we have structured the economic assistance component of our program will result in some relief to that debt structure. The bottom line here is that we do not think this is going to be an unreasonable debt burden resulting from what we are doing here, and that in fact over a period of time this total package will allow for continuation of the economic growth. That economic growth, incidentally, overall for recent years has been 6 percent per year.

SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDING FUNDS

Senator HAYAKAWA. What worries me is whether Pakistan can afford to pay for F–16's. I understand that Saudi Arabia is providing the financing?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Let me defer to Secretary Buckley in terms of the financing for the planes, but Saudi Arabia has indeed provided economic assistance over the years and indicates that they in future years plan to provide a substantial amount, but we do not have an exact figure.

Incidentally, one of the real economic benefits that the country has are remittances. In fact, remittances are about twice the amount of the oil import bill of the country—remittances of funds from people who leave Pakistan to work in the Persian Gulf States.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Explain that matter about remittances again, please.

Mr. MCPHERSON. There are substantial remittances.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MCPHERSON. Funds which flow back to Pakistan from individuals who leave Pakistan to work in the Gulf States. An interesting figure——

Senator HAYAKAWA. Oh, like the large number of Guest workers in Saudi Arabia?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MCPHERSON. And the remittances are about twice the amount that the country uses or must pay to import oil; so in fact the relationship is a very positive one.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I see.

Thank you very much.

U.S. PROPORTION OF ASSISTANCE

So what proportion of Pakistan's overall assistance will be provided them by the United States?

Mr. MCPHERSON. In 1982 it will be about 10 percent.

Senator HAYAKAWA. About 10 percent.

Mr. MCPHERSON. And with increased assistance, I assume it will move up to the range of near 20 percent.

supreme national interest to Turkey, but the Turks apparently thought it was.

But with regard to India and Pakistan, if they go to war again, it would seem to me no matter what restrictions are placed on them, each nation would feel compelled to use its weapons. And while I would hope not, they might be tempted to even use nuclear weapons. What would be your view? Do you see restrictions having an inhibiting effect in a conflict of this sort?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Not if a country is at war and feels that its national survival is at stake. What we are trying to inhibit is someone going to war, initiating a war. That is where the offensive constraints come into play.

In terms of the fact that people have the power to ignore you, one has to ask, is it in their interest to ignore you? We believe that the kind of relationship that we want to develop with Pakistan will continue into the future, well into the future, to our mutual benefit; and that the forfeiture of that relationship would be a very heavy price to pay.

Senator PELL. I cannot recall, but maybe you do, that in the India-Pakistan war, if the same restrictions were applied to American weapons that were being used by both sides. Do you recall that?

Mr. BUCKLEY. No; I do not recall.

Senator PELL. I guess it was so long ago and the institutional memory is so short, and my memory is not all that hot, that none of us seems to remember that. I will have that point inserted into the record by our staff.

[The information referred to follows:]

Weapons provided India and Pakistan have been intended to be used for defensive purposes. In the 1965 India-Pakistan war, both sides used American weapons against each other. Following that war, the Johnson Administration sought to limit for a time military sales to the subcontinent to "non-lethal" items.

Senator PELL. As I understand it now, Pakistan has about three-fourths of its military forces directed against India or on the Indian border as opposed to the Afghanistan border to the north, is that correct?

Mr. BUCKLEY. It sounds appropriate. I do not have the exact figures, but I would, however, point out that it is my understanding that the Indians have the great bulk of their forces on the same border, and they have larger forces to start with.

Senator PELL. Of course, they do not have too many other borders. But I would agree with you that that is where they are.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HAYAKAWA [presiding]. I have a couple of questions for Mr. McPherson.

PAKISTAN DEBT STRUCTURE

Pakistan is faced with large debts and restructuring of its debt has been of primary importance to Pakistan. What is the current status of Pakistan's debt structure? How much of the debt has been rescheduled by the United States?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Currently, Pakistan has a 3-year IMF agreement, a standby facility which is providing them something in excess of $1

DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET ARMS

Officials here believe that, with the Mirage deal, Mrs. Gandhi is seeking in part to strengthen her reputation as a leader of a nation calling itself nonaligned by reducing her country's growing dependence on Soviet equipment, particularly after India's recent decision to buy MIG–23's as replacements for its MIG–21's. According to recent press reports, the Soviet Union has tried to wrest the sale away from France by offering India equally advanced fighters of its own at lower prices.

Indian diplomats strongly deny that their interest in buying an advanced combat aircraft has any connection with the Reagan Administration's decision to sell F–16 fighters to Pakistan, India's traditional rival. They say that the Indian Air Force needs the new plane to replace its aging British-built Hunters and Canberras, and they point out that negotiations with France opened long before the American-Pakistani deal was envisioned.

Before coming to power in May, President Mitterrand denounced the outgoing Giscard Administration's energetic campaign to sell arms to the third world, saying it wasted money needed for economic development and increased international tension.

Today, however, French officials said the new French Government believes the sale of the Mirage 2000 to India would strengthen France's ties with a major Asian nation, reduce the risk of war between India and Pakistan by creating a better balance of power in the area and stop the Soviet Union from gaining influence in the Asian subcontinent by emerging as India's principal arms supplier.

France's Socialist Government has recently taken some steps to reduce arms exports to the third world, warning that it will not sign any new contracts with governments that it regards as totalitarian or racist, although existing orders are being honored. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy has pledged the Government to "progressively cease being a major seller of arms on an international scale."

During the Giscard Presidency, France emerged as the world's third largest weapons exporter after the United States and the Soviet Union, earning nearly $5 billion from exports last year and employing some 300,000 people in its armament industry. In addition, French arms makers say export orders help increase production runs and bring down the cost of weapons France needs itself.

Senator PELL. I think I am correct but I do not have the citation with me. However, I do think I am correct, and if I am wrong, I hope you will let me know. In other words, the Mig's have nothing to do with the F–16's, but the Mirages do, as I understand it.

Has India asked for any assurances that the F–16's would not be used against them? That question is addressed to anyone who wishes to field it.

LAW REQUIRES ONLY DEFENSIVE USE

Mr. BUCKLEY. I am not aware that they have. Their concerns clearly indicate that they think they might. The fact remains that our law requires the equipment to be used defensively, and that there is a threat for which this is an appropriate response, and that threat is not India.

Senator PELL. As was touched on earlier in the questioning, the difference between defense and offense, as Senator Glenn brought out, depends upon your viewpoint. Weapons, for example, that we have given to Turkey are being used allegedly by Turkey for defensive purposes to occupy a substantial portion of Cyprus. I think your viewpoint depends on who you are.

I think, in a matter of supreme national interest, any nation is not going to place too much attention to the restrictions placed on a weapons system. I would question in the case of Cyprus if that was of

Let me return for a moment to the question of the French Mirage. I think the Indian Government issued a statement—and I have asked our staff to check it out—to the effect that it was a response to the F–16 sale; that if the F–16's were not being sold to Pakistan, the Indians would not be going ahead with the Mirage.

Am I correct in that information, Mr. Turentine?

Mr. TURRENTINE. Senator Pell, I will check that out. I am not sure of the facts on that. I will check it out, and I will get back to you on it.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
November 23, 1981.

Senator CLAIBORNE PELL,
Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PELL: During the SFRC hearing on November 12 regarding the sale of F–16 aircraft to Pakistan, you inquired into possible linkage between that sale and the reported Indian negotiations to obtain 150 Mirage 2000 aircraft from France. Specifically, the question raised the point of whether the F–16 sale prompted the Mirage 2000 sale thereby feeding an arms race in the Subcontinent.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is, of course, vitally concerned with arms race issues. We therefore evaluated the case with particular concern for possible linkage between the two sales. Since my meeting with the SFRC, I have looked into the matter further. Based on my review, it is clear to me that India was proceeding in negotiations with France at least one and possibly two years ago, well before U.S. negotiations with Pakistan on the F–16. In my judgment, the Indians appear to have sought the Mirage 2000 with the intention of replacing much older aircraft.

Attached is a November 13 article from the *New York Times*, indicating that both French and Indian officials claim the Mirage 2000 negotiation was moving forward irrespective of and well in advance of the F–16 sale. The weight of evidence supports this judgment.

I appreciate your interest in this matter.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

ARCH TURRENTINE,
Deputy Assistant Director,
Nuclear and Weapons Control.

Attachment: as stated.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 13, 1981]

PARIS SEEKING TO CLOSE INDIAN JET DEAL

(By Paul Lewis)

PARIS, NOVEMBER 12.—France's Socialist Government hopes to conclude its first major foreign-arms deal, a $3.3 billion sale of advanced Mirage fighter-bombers to India, during a 3-day official visit begun here today by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

French officials say negotiations for the sale, which began more than two years ago during the Presidency of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, are now in their final stages. Although they do not expect Mrs. Gandhi to sign any formal contracts, they hope that she and President Francois Mitterrand can reach an agreement that would allow the deal to be completed.

Under the proposed deal, France would supply India with up to 150 of its newly developed Mirage 2000, a delta-winged, all-purpose combat aircraft that is intended to be the mainstay of the French airforce.

The planes are to be built by the French concern Avions Dassault-Breguet, which the Socialists have just nationalized. But the Indians would also like to assemble some of the aircraft themselves.

Senator PELL. Do you really believe that decision is made so that whether we sell or do not sell the F–16's to Pakistan, India will not change its buy package in any way?

Mr. TURRENTINE. That is my personal judgment; yes, sir.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I may add, I have some figures that have been provided to me that show the Indians have under order about 118 aircraft. I guess they are the Mig–23's, 25's, and Jaguars. The Mirage sale would be in addition to that. It would be 150 more aircraft. And that kind of negotiation did not start 3 months ago. It started over 1 year ago.

Senator PELL. Out of curiosity, how do the Indians pay for it? Do the Russians give them their Mig's or is it on credit or how is that handled?

Mr. MAYHEW. I think, in general, the sales of Mig's by the Soviets have been on extremely favorable terms, but they have been sales.

Senator PELL. I could not hear you. Would you please speak a little louder?

Mr. MAYHEW. I think the Soviet provision of Mig's have been sales, but they have been on extremely favorable terms. The French, of course, would be providing for cash sales.

Senator PELL. The French would want cash on the barrelhead.

Mr. MAYHEW. Well, it may be over time, but certainly it would be a cash sale. It could be a credit sale but certainly would not be assistance.

Mr. BUCKLEY. The French sale is described in a Reuters dispatch today as a $3.3 billion deal. That is a lot of cash.

PROGRAM AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER NEEDY NATIONS

Senator PELL. I would like to ask Mr. McPherson if he did not feel because of the sizable economic component of the package, which is just about equal or almost equal to your entire worldwide bilateral development aid, will not this new program be at the expense of many more needy nations around the world? In other words, there is only so much money, so are you not robbing an awful lot of Peters for this one Pakistani Paul?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Well, I certainly do not want to rob any Peters.

Senator PELL. But you have no choice. Someone has to be robbed.

Mr. MCPHERSON. This program is spread out over several years, Senator, and it seems to us that it is really a very necessary critical component of the whole package. It is true that our fiscal year 1983 proposal has not really been put together, but surely there will be some sacrifice to other parts of the program or other additional increases that we might have.

We are finding, of course, that in every one of these movements, every time we do something, obviously there is a consideration somewhere else. I do think, Senator, that in fact the economic component of this package has the likelihood of some very substantial economic growth impact. I spent a great deal of time in that country recently, not just in ministries but in villages; and I believe there is a great deal of change and growth that can be substantially augmented by our economic approach.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

just seems that our entire foreign policy sort of mirrors what appears to be our economic policy. This is a supplyside foreign policy.

We are getting a reputation around the world for little else than being a discount house of arms.

I think that is the worst reputation that this country could have. In my mind, the sale is another reflection and example of that policy. This has to change.

I think it is going to take some bipartisan voices in the Senate and in the House to express to the administration that it has to move away from that as the sole justification for foreign policy decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I will vote against the sale on that basis and hope that at some point the administration will begin to look at the world in broader terms than just an East-West confrontation and just for arms as a way of seeking some solutions of pressing foreign policy considerations that scream for attention, which are not going to be solved by just escalating and ratcheting up the level of sophisticated arms around the globe.

So, I will oppose the sale.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Is there anyone else who would like to comment?

I would like to indicate my own support for the sale and, therefore, my vote against the resolution of disapproval.

I think the sale is absolutely essential to maintaining good bilateral relations with Pakistan. This country is beleaguered on one side by the invasion of Afghanistan and harbors now 2.25 million refugees. There are hostile forces surrounding Pakistan. Also, there is the knowledge that there are huge arms sales that have been made by the Soviet Union to India, further reinforced by the probable purchase by India of several hundred more of the most sophisticated Mirage-2000 aircraft. The air balance is overwhelming, with India 3 to 1 against Pakistan. By no stretch of the imagination can Pakistan offer a threat to India.

But Pakistan is in a situation where it is highly vulnerable, vulnerable to other forces which are looked upon as hostile forces and are regarded as such.

There certainly is some concern about the regime of President Zia, and I share that concern. I have had my own difference of opinion with President Zia. But this is support for the people of Pakistan and reinforces the fact that we recognize their problem. We recognize also that in doing everything we can to resist the pressures internally to move forward with nuclear weapons and to denote such a device, we have to have some conventional alternative to offer.

I think, as a practical matter, if we have a resolution which says that we will cut off assistance and aid to any country which detonates, and we have virtually no significant assistance and aid to cut off, then, frankly, we lose our leverage. A country would have to think twice if it became more dependent upon U.S. forces, aid, assistance, and sales, about a decision to detonate. I think this would increase our leverage considerably and would take Pakistan away from the position of isolation, in a sense, that it had before, which provided a basis for insecurity.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa, Secretary Haig is on the telephone and I must take the call. Would you please chair the hearing in my absence? I will be right back.

Senator HAYAKAWA [presiding]. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Pell, have you completed your statement?

Senator PELL. Yes, I have. My views have been succinctly expressed.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

I would welcome any other comments on the issue of the F–16's.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have to leave at 12:30 and would like to make a brief statement of how I will vote, if I may do so.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Please do.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have been concerned about the spiraling effects of armaments around the world and our involvement in this role. I think it is something that troubles us all as we try to sort through the priorities of our arms sales and where they are indeed very important to us and to the area.

Although troubled by this and certainly recognizing much of the importance of what Senator Hatfield has said in his expression of concern, I have come to believe, however, that the sale is important to our striking a balance in that particular region at this point.

We not only have had the threat of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which caused us grave concern and still does, but it was a forward thrust of the Soviets into an area and a region into which they never had gone before. I think this does provide a very clear statement of our intent to be of assistance to those who have stood up against the Soviet intrusion there.

For this reason, and in the belief that it will be of benefit to us as well as to Pakistan in trying to maintain an independent status there, I will support the sale of the F–16's to Pakistan.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Are there any further comments?

Senator PELL. I hear there is a vote on now.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Does anyone else seek recognition before we go to vote?

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, let me express to the Chair and to my colleagues on the committee why I will oppose the sale.

This was not an easy decision. It was not until a few short moments ago that I finally decided to oppose it.

My basic reasons, Mr. Chairman, have to do with the broader question of this administration's foreign policy, rather than with the particular questions which face us in Southwest Asia. There are some very compelling reasons why this sale should be approved. But I think those compelling reasons are outweighed by what I have seen over the past 9 or 10 months as the total absence of a broader foreign policy.

The AWACS, El Salvador, a military solution, a proposed F–16 sale for Venezuela, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, and no real movement, despite some rhetoric, on arms limitation talks—it

pletely fail to comprehend how one can be anything but horrified at the potential for disaster we stand to create through this sale. The vision of nuclear weapons and F–16 fighters in the hands of General Zia is as fundamentally frightening a prospect as I can imagine in this volatile age.

While it is suggested that enough conventional arms might induce Pakistan to abandon the nuclear option, there is absolutely no evidence that this theory will work. A recent State Department cable reveals that "We have strong reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosive capability". There is speculation that Pakistan is seeking an "Islamic bomb" in conjunction with Colonel Qadhafi. A report by the London Observer indicates that Libya has supplied Pakistan with uranium ore. If these reports are inaccurate, the burden of proof lies with these who are promoting the gamble. A German-based company is now assisting Libya in developing a long-range, surface-to-surface missile. It would be natural for Pakistan, rapidly developing an offensive nuclear capability, to cooperate with the Libyans on a delivery system. Both Islamic countries could then have missiles with nuclear warheads. This prospect will hopefully jolt those who are comforted by the notion that it may be some years before Pakistan could develop an atomic bomb small enough to be carried on F–16's.

We are setting the stage for another pre-emptive strike against a nation suspected of developing offensive nuclear capability. The provisions on aid introduced by Senator Glenn, which would necessitate an aid cut-off if a nuclear device is detonated, do not apply to the F–16 package.

Finally, there is the question of allegiance. I tend to lose my objectivity when I recall the wanton act of terrorism which occurred less than two years ago when the Zia government stood by in passive indifference while two American personnel were killed, the U.S. Embassy was burned to the ground, and other U.S. Government facilities were destroyed. It took the Zia regime more than five hours to respond to the desperate pleas of the Americans trapped in the Embassy. The American people have yet to be provided with an apology, let alone an explanation or full reimbursement for this murderous violation of international law. The Pakistani Government can never replace the lives of the personnel who were killed in that incident. The Government of Pakistan has not moved to punish those who conducted the attack. Serious questions remain unanswered regarding the involvement of the Pakistani Government in this act. Can anyone seriously believe that these same individuals can be trusted to defend American interests? The substance of Pakistan's allegiance to the United States is even more questionable than its own stability. Even if our convenient friends in the Zia regime are in power on the day when we need them, what evidence exists that they can help us in the face of bitter domestic opposition greatly exacerbated by this jet-fighter sale?

This nation is fast becoming the world's most compulsive gambler. With so much talk of renewed commitment to our real friends, we now move to bestow "allied status" on a regime that so recently displayed supreme disregard for this nation and which has always displayed disregard for our ideals. This sale represents a desperate substitute for the genius and the courage which the increasingly dangerous global situation requires of us. I have been as critical of the Soviet Union as anyone. I deplore the mark of totalitarianism. I condemn the brutality and spiritual bankruptcy of their system. But we must stand for something. This sale is intended to signal strength and resolve to the Soviets. It in fact signals confused purpose and hollow commitment. We are becoming the national image of a gambler who disregards his family's welfare, blinds himself to the future, and blanks out the past in a feverish effort to achieve immediate and total security.

I appeal to the Foreign Relations Committee to reject this dangerous and compulsive toss of the dice. We cannot afford to confuse that which is desirable with that which is possible. A rejection of this sale will not make life any easier for us. It will not rid us of the dilemma which confronts us. In fact, it will add a new dimension to the already ominous responsibilities we face. But I am certain that the other alternative—the acceptance of this sale—spells disaster not only for the United States, but for mankind. Let us choose the more difficult road, secure in the knowledge that we rejected the simple answer.

Sincerely,

MARK O. HATFIELD,
U.S. Senator.

Deployment Force. It is a strong supporter of the PLO and a close friend of Libya. Nor, as Senator Hatfield reminds us, should we forget the recent past. Can we trust a regime that for five hours stood by while our Embassy was rutted to protect our most vital interests? Should we sell such a regime our most sophisticated aircraft?

I shall vote for the Resolution of Disapproval offered by Senators Hatfield and Moynihan on the F–16 sale. I do not believe the sale is in our interest, nor, over the long run, is it in the interest of the people of Pakistan.

[Senator Hatfield's letter follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C., November 17, 1981.

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: I appreciate the opportunity to present the case for a Resolution of Disapproval on the proposed sale of F–16 fighters to Pakistan. I would like to say at the outset that I do not accept this role with enthusiasm. I would be the first to assert that a friendly Pakistan would be a tremendous asset to U.S. interests in Southern Asia. But I am convinced that we are dreaming. What we would like to accomplish, and what the evidence indicates we can expect to accomplish, are worlds apart in the case of this sale.

First, the question of stability. The extremely tentative power base held by General Zia in Pakistan is well-known. His is a brutal and unstable government unable to provide even the base necessities of life for its people. The future, as I see it, points only to General Zia's imminent demise. The people of Pakistan will not view this new security relationship as an expression of friendship; rather they will view it as an open-armed embrace of the unpopular Zia regime. Top leaders of the Pakistan Peoples' Party, the party it is generally agreed would win free elections, have warned that if this security package goes through, they will terminate the relationship when and if they assume the reins of power. If we were embarking on an exploratory arrangement—a limited package of economic and military support designed to create a constructive relationship, there would be less need for concern. But we are talking about 40 sophisticated aircraft totalling over $1 billion, and an economic-military package totaling $3 billion for one of the least developed nations on the globe.

The second point I would like to address is the prospect of an endlessly spiralling arms race on the Indian Subcontinent. India and Pakistan have fought three wars in the last 34 years. India's increasing intimacy with the Soviet Union and its policy of non-criticism over the invasion of Afghanistan rightly concern the Administration and Congress. While I am disturbed over India's pro-Soviet leanings, I do not believe that the facts in any way suggest that she has become a hopelessly pro-Soviet surrogate. India's foreign policy has always been characterized by non-alignment. But there are now disconcerting indicators that pro-Soviet factions in India, once on the defense over Afghanistan, are being rejuvenated. Indian anxieties over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appear to be giving way to a renewed preoccupation with the Chinese-Pakistani-American challenge. Sentiment for a joint India-Pakistan response to the Soviet threat was once powerful, but it is being replaced with stirrings for a pre-emptive nuclear showdown with Islamabad.

The underlying rationale behind the Pakistan security arrangement is to deter Soviet adventurism and to reinforce our position with respect to the Persian Gulf. Let us examine this assumption carefully. As recently as four months ago, Pakistan's foreign minister announced that the Soviet Union was not a central threat to Pakistan. Two-thirds of the Pakistani military is deployed not along the Afghanistan border, but on the Indian border. Pakistan has expressed unqualified opposition to the Administration's goals in the region, including the concept of a Rapid Deployment Force. Of course, it is possible this open-armed embrace of General Zia will ultimately result in moderation of these positions. But considering the magnitude and the implications of the $4 billion we intend to invest in Pakistan, one would think that changes would have already been forthcoming. Instead, we receive signals that any tampering with the aid package will result in Pakistan's rejecting the entire idea.

Significant though this aid may be when viewed in a vacuum, it is light-years away from being sufficient to deter an invasion by the Soviet Union. Interceptor aircraft would be far better suited to Pakistan's defense than F–16 fighters. I com-

The CHAIRMAN. There is a time limitation. The time expires on Sunday. If the Senate does not act by Sunday, then the sale would go forward as approved. A resolution of disapproval is necessary in this case. It has been offered.

I believe, Senator Pell, you are one of the sponsors of that.

Senator PELL. Yes, I am a cosponsor of it.

I have a letter from Senator Hatfield, who is the principal sponsor, strongly objecting to the sale.

I would ask that at a suitable point in the committee's hearing record of today my statement in opposition to the sale and the letter from Senator Hatfield be inserted into the record.

Also, I would like to read into the record a very interesting letter from the Indian Embassy, which does not jibe with what we were informed last week.

It says,

In response to inquiries made by you regarding the U.S. decision to sell F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, I am writing to state that our position was made clear by our Minister of State for Defense, Mr. Shivraj Patil in our Parliament on August 19, 1981, when he said: "The F-16 aircraft represents the introduction into this region of a class of aircraft a generation ahead of anything operating with the other Air Forces in the area. The combat aircraft currently operating in the subcontinent are all of the late 1960's or early 1970's technology. In its offensive role, the F-16 can go much further and carry much bigger bomb loads than any other aircraft in the region."

I am also writing to state that, as already verbally mentioned to you, the decision of the U.S. Administration to sell F-16 aircraft to Pakistan has necessitated our Government having to consider the purchase of technologically sophisticated weapons, including the Mirage 2000 aircraft.

This is signed "G. Parthasarathy," who is the Counselor of the Indian Embassy. It is addressed to Mr. Galbraith of our staff.

I would ask that my statement and Senator Hatfield's letter be inserted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, those will be incorporated into the record at this point.

[Senator Pell's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIBORNE PELL

The sale of 40 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan is intended to promote American security by building a "new relationship" with Pakistan. I am concerned that the sale, and the massive assistance package, will diminish our security in the area and do serious, if not irreparable, harm to our long-term relations with Pakistan.

The present regime in Pakistan is a military dictatorship despised by its own people and with an uncertain future. State Department Human Rights reports, Amnesty International, as well as evidence gathered by our own staff confirm a pattern of serious human rights abuses. Particularly alarming are the increasing instances of mistreatment of political prisoners by the regime.

Our assistance and arms sales are widely seen as United States support for the Zia dictatorship. For this reason U.S. assistance and sales are vehemently opposed by many Pakistanis including the leadership of the most popular political force in the country, the Pakistan People's Party. Pakistani Opposition leaders warn that our identification with Zia could earn us the enmity of the Pakistani people and preclude a long-term relationship.

The sale of F-16 aircraft will certainly escalate a subcontinent arms race that is already needlessly diverting billions of dollars desperately needed for economic development. The F-16 is inappropriate to Pakistan's defensive needs and given the history of India-Pakistan conflict is more likely to be used against India than the Soviet Union. I see no merit in increasing the destructive capabilities of countries which have fought three wars in 34 years.

Finally, I question the assumption underlying this sale that Pakistan can be depended on to share our interests. Pakistan, for example, opposes the Rapid

BUSINESS MEETING (PROPOSED ARMS SALES OF F-16's TO PAKISTAN)

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1981

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:24 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has a full agenda, and since a number of our colleagues are under time constraints, we will move along as rapidly as we can.

* * * * * * *

Senator PELL. Would you rather go instead to the Pakistan business?

The CHAIRMAN. Both items, in a sense, are interrelated, so maybe it would be best to go to Senate Congressional Resolution 48, the resolution disapproving the proposed sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan and wait until Senator Mathias returns to take up the other business.

Senator MATHIAS. Speak of the angels and you will hear the flutter of their wings. [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I heard the thud of the feet, but I missed the flutter of the wings. [General laughter.]

We do have a problem on timing in that Senator Pell must leave in a few minutes. I don't know how much discussion there will be on the F-16 aircraft. Maybe everyone is prepared to vote on that now.

We were about to take that up, Senator Mathias, before you came into the room.

If it is all right with you, suppose we take up the F-16 aircraft sale to Pakistan now.

Mr. SANDERS [staff director]. Mr. Chairman, I would point out that we do not have a quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we would not have a quorum for the Foreign Missions Act, either.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we proceed for a few minutes on the Foreign Missions Act and see if we can't handle that expeditiously. If we can take up the matter of the F-16's before Senator Pell has to leave, that would be most helpful.

Senator PELL. The F-16 matter has to be taken up today because of the time constraints.

1730 Internal defense force reconnoiter third floor and determine that while it is clear of rioters it is an impossible escape route for the employees in the vault due to intense heat and smoke.

1730 Group from American Club escape through rear gate to Pakistani military trucks parked just off the compound.

1730–1800 Pakistan troops take control of compound; demonstrators leave compound.

1745 Heat in vault increasing to the point where employees have to stand.

1750 Heavy blast felt within vault. Sounds of mob activity from roof continues. Shots being fired through roof air vent down into vault.

1800 Internal defense team secures roof.

1815 Ambassador advised by radio of Pakistan Army assurance that roof area is clear.

1820 Internal defense force opens escape hatch.

1825 Evacuation of vault begins with women, Pakistani employees, and Americans following.

1830 Pakistan military assists evacuees from roof.

1845 RSO, TCU and CPU personnel leave the vault after checking to insure that classified has all been secured.

1850 All personnel have left the chancery roof and are moving to the ground level.

1900 Pakistan Army units transport evacuees to British Embassy.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

1250 Embassy notified by Sub-Inspector that police superintendent in charge is not in Islamabad but in Rawalpindi.
1250 Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted again by Ambassador and by the Political Counselor.
1300 Marines are deployed inside chancery.
1300 Demonstrators return in 8 to 12 buses; disembark and begin shouting and throwing rocks at police near Embassy front entrance.
1300 Embassy contacts senior police supervisor in Rawalpindi. Embassy is advised that police are on the way from Rawalpindi.
1300 Two police trucks and a fire truck arrive at the southeast corner of the Embassy compound.
1310 Embassy calls police again and advised that two vans of police are on the way.
1315 Police retreat towards front of chancery building. A crowd of over 200 breach exterior perimeter wall and immediately move toward chancery building. Police fire over heads of demonstrators but are overcome and demonstrators take weapons.
1315 Demonstrators return fire.
1315 Embassy once again calls police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1315–1320 MSG Sergeant Crowley shot while manning post six on roof of chancery.
1315 Embassy personnel moving to safehaven area.
1320 Gunshots break windows in Political Section of chancery.
1320 Internal defense team holding second floor area while Embassy staff move to third floor.
1330 Demonstrators attack American Club.
1340 Demonstrators occupy entire compound, concentrate attack on chancery building, set fires to vehicles in the private parking area, the motorpool area and attack the American Club and staff apartments.
1340 Demonstrators break into ground floor of chancery through the cafeteria by pulling grill work off the windows.
1340–1800 COS at British Embassy informing host government contacts of the situation and requesting assistance.
1345 MSG Sgt. Parry confronts demonstrators in hallway near cafeteria. Parry moves to second floor lobby area after throwing tear gas grenades down stairwell to first floor.
1400 Embassy again calls police.
1400 Telephone contact established from vault area to Ambassador at residence.
1400 All American and Foreign Service national employees with the exception of internal defense team inside vault.
1410 Smoke on third floor increasing. Ambassador is requested to have host government send fire brigade. This communication repeated throughout the afternoon.
1410 RSS establishes radio contact with vault and phone contact with ConGen Karachi.
1415 Two dozen police arrive outside Embassy and enter compound.
1430 Demonstrators control chancery roof.
1430–1700 Pakistani military helicopters hovering over compound.
1445 Internal defense team retreats from second floor to third floor vault dispensing tear gas behind them.
1500 Demonstrators break through barriers into second floor area.
1500 Armored Pakistan Army jeep arrives at front of compound but does not attempt to enter compound.
1520 Embassy nurse reports that MSG Corporal Crowley must be moved to a hospital immediately or he will die.
1525 Embassy nurse advised Corporal Crowley is dead. FLASH SITREP sent to the Department.
1530 Ambassador moves from residence to the Foreign Ministry.
1530 Demonstrators gain access to third floor area.
1530–1800 Demonstrators on roof attempt to break through the escape hatch and gain access to vault.
1545 Telephone lines cut but radio communication maintained with Ambassador and other persons off chancery ground.
1600 Two trucks of Pakistan military troops with commo equipment arrive at compound.
1700 Smoke and heat increasing. Employees in vault urged to stay low and move as little as possible.

The procession constantly changed direction due to the activities of the mob. During one such change the main group was divided into several smaller groups but were subsequently reunited. Four of the group, however, were separated during this movement and made their way to safety through other means. One of these, Thomas Putsher, had the unique experience of being held hostage at a local university for some hours and it appears from Putsher's experience that the students may have intended to take a number of American hostages from the Embassy but were thwarted in this by the Pakistan Army. Three women were also separated at this time; one was rescued by Pakistan police and taken to her home after having been confronted by a female demonstrator who tried to rip her clothes. Another was rescued by the restaurant manager who took her out of the compound on a motorcycle. The third woman was a Canadian citizen and the wife of a Canadian External Affairs Officer. Based on this, she was released by the crowd. None of the four persons separated during the move to the trucks were seriously harmed although they were subjected to considerable abuse including being spat on, hit with objects, and having their clothing ripped.

The remainder of the group eventually reached a site near the perimeter fence of the servants' quarters' gate. There they sat and waited while the mob stood over them chanting anti-U.S. slogans and offering verbal abuse. At approximately 1730 hours, the police detachment herded them out the rear gate into a large two and one-half ton Bedford truck parked just off the compound. There were 10 to 15 Pakistani police officers in the truck. As the demonstrators noted the escape of the group from the compound, they attempted to pull the American women into buses parked nearby.

With the help of the police, this was prevented and all reached the safety of the truck. The truck moved out in the direction of Quaid-E-Azam University. After driving approximately 1½ miles, a bus loaded with Pakistani students blocked the road while a second student bus pulled up behind the truck blocking any retreat. Within moments, a Pakistani military force arrived on the scene and "negotiated" the release of the trapped truck. It was apparently agreed that the men would be delivered to the University in exchange for the safe passage of the women and children. The seven men were transferred to a covered Army vehicle and driven from the scene in the direction of Quaid-E-Azam University. Once out of sight of the demonstrators the military vehicle turned around and went back toward the Embassy. It passed the site where the truck had originally been stopped and proceeded on to Islamabad. As they drove toward Islamabad, they could see the rear of the Embassy. The compound was a scene of total destruction. Approximately 30 minutes later, after negotiating streets still filled with mobs of Pakistanis, they reached the military headquarters of the Punjab Regiment at West Ridge, Rawalpindi. Shortly thereafter, they were joined by the six women and two children who had been left behind in the truck used to escape from the compound area. Neither the women nor the children had been harmed. All the evacuees were provided warm food, bedding, and medical care as required. A heavy military security guard was placed around their building and they were offered all the hospitality of the military camp. The next day, at noon, they left the military base to return to Islamabad. Once again, they were provided a strong military escort. Without exception, they were extremely well treated while in the hands of the Pakistani military.

Chronology of Events: November 21, 1979

1225 Two busloads of students observed moving in direction of Embassy. Embassy alerted.
1225 SY notifies police of impending demonstration.
1226 MSG's sound recall.
1230 Embassy notifies police Assistant Sub-Inspector on compound of impending demonstration.
1235 Students arrive in two buses at front entrance to Embassy chanting and throwing rocks.
1240 Ambassador contacts host government and asks for assistance. Ambassador speaks with foreign secretary Shahbawaz and then General Arif, Military Aide to President Zia. Ambassador continues making contact with host government authorities, including President Zia and requesting assistance.
1240 Embassy notifies police Deputy Sub-Inspector of situation on the compound. Embassy is advised that help is on the way.
1240 Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified of situation.
1245 Police detachment on compound talks demonstrators into leaving area.

attack. At approximately 1310, two armed Pakistani police officers took up positions near the Club, one at the entrance and the other near the rear vehicle gate. In the Club, 15 Americans and one Canadian were having lunch. Shortly after the demonstration began, Mr. Saraj, the American Club Manager, instructed his employees to draw the window drapes, turn off the lights, and lock the Club doors. The people in the Club moved into Mr. Saraj's private office behind the Club bar. This office was chosen as a temporary safehaven because it could be secured from the inside. Shortly thereafter the mob attacked the Club breaking windows and attempting to smash the entrance door. Initially, the mob gained access to the Club through the kitchen area. Once inside, they began smashing furniture and equipment, completely ransacking the Club. However, there was no attempt at this time to enter Mr. Saraj's office. Apparently the mob did not know that the office was occupied. The mob remained in the Club for 15 to 20 minutes. The kitchen area of the Club had been set on fire but as soon as the mob departed the FSNs extinguished the flames.

At approximately 1330 hours a small contingent of police arrived at the Club, temporarily relieving the besieged staff. The police were led by a Pakistani in civilian clothes who time and time again during the afternoon demonstrated his concern over the welfare of the persons in his charge. Directly outside the American Club, a small fire truck and a few firemen were desperately trying to put out a number of fires in the area. Firemen had removed fire hoses from their truck but did not have the necessary wrenches to open the water valves. Their efforts were laudable, but unsuccessful. All of the vehicles in the private parking lot, as well as vehicles parked behind the Club were burning. Occasionally, shots could be heard over the noise of the mob. The B block apartment complex was in flames as was the dispensary. There was extensive damage to the A block apartment complex but it was not burning at that time.

At approximately 1400 hours, elements of the mob returned and with a vengeance re-attacked the Club area. The police and fire contingents were busy elsewhere and once again the group took refuge in Mr. Saraj's office. After approximately 10 to 15 minutes, it was clear that the entire Club was in flames. After moving from one office to another, they were forced to vacate the Club building, grouping together outside the main Club entrance while Mr. Saraj planned a safe escape route from the compound area. By this time all the apartment buildings, as well as the fire truck near the Club, were in flames. A small element of Pakistan police came to their defense as a large number of demonstrators pressed in from all sides. The police fired several warning shots in the air and forced the demonstrators back. Nevertheless, the mob began throwing rocks, stones and other objects at the group. For the next two hours, they remained huddled against a small 3 foot wall not far from the Club area. They were eventually joined by the Dorman family carrying their young son, bringing the total in the group to 19. They had just escaped from one of the apartment complexes by climbing out the rear bedroom window and had been escorted to the main group by some of the demonstrators. This was not the only time that elements of the mob provided assistance to Americans trapped on the compound.

During the period that the group was huddled against the wall for protection, they were continually engulfed by the mob. The police, desperately trying to keep the mob away, were assisted by some of the less violent demonstrators who sought to protect the evacuees from other more radical elements who were shouting "kill them, kill them, lynch them, lynch them." At approximately 1530, the police were joined by four or five Pakistani soldiers carrying automatic weapons over their shoulders. They assisted in holding back the mob which had been throwing rocks and debris at the group. The evacuees were spit upon, jostled, insulted and generally abused. No one was seriously injured, however. An AID TDY employee, Tom Puteher, was struck by a thrown object and cut. Although there were no instances of rape or specific sexual abuse of the female personnel, they all were manhandled and two employees saw a man in the crowd urinate on part of the huddled group from the crowd standing on the wall behind the group.

At approximately 1630 hours, the military/police, encircling the 19 evacuees, began moving slowly across the compound in the direction of the Marine House and the servants' quarters gate. The pace was painfully slow, and frequently interrupted by the mob. The demonstrators continually jostled the group, stripping the evacuees of wallets, watches and anything they could get their hands on. The American women were manhandled and the men were struck again and again with stones and other sharp weapons whenever the mob could break through the small ring of police and military.

escape hatch leading to the vault. They had also fired weapons from the roof through the air vent down into the vault area below. At approximately 1750 hours, these activities stopped and the Admin Counselor and other responsible officials in the vault surmised that the attackers may have vacated the roof due to the intense heat and flame. Because of the desperate situation in the vault, i.e., the rapid depletion of oxygen and the strong possibility of burning to death, Admin Counselor Fields requested that the emergency hatch be opened. An attempt was made to open the hatch from inside the vault but it had been jammed by the demonstrators and could not be forced open.

At approximately 1800 hours, the NCOIC and two MSGs, acting under the orders of Fields, left the vault to gain access to the roof via the southeast stairwell. Once again, they had orders to use lethal force, as necessary, in order to clear the roof area. Upon reaching the roof of the chancery, they found it free of attackers. The best estimate of when the attackers left the roof is around 1800 hours, shortly before the internal defense team gained access to the roof. At approximately 1820, after intensive efforts, the emergency escape hatch was forced open. The MSGs and DEA agents provided cover while the remaining members of the internal defense team left the vault and took up defensive positions on the roof.

The evacuation from the vault was orderly and controlled with the women, then FSN employees and finally American staff leaving, in that order. NCOIC Miller carried the body of MSG Crowley from the vault to the roof and subsequently to the ground below. The last persons to leave the vault were the communications supervisors. They insured that the vault door was secure and that all safes and repositories had been locked. The emergency escape hatch was then closed and secured from the outside. During the evacuation from the vault, members of the internal defense force assumed positions on the auditorium roof which joined the chancery. Ladders provided by Pakistani military/police authorities were then placed against the side of the walls and the employees descended to the ground. As the MSGs vacated the roof, Pakistani military personnel attempted to disarm them. The MSGs refused to surrender their weapons. There was some disorganization among GOP elements at that point with respect to arranging the transportation from the chancery to the British Embassy, a short distance away. Most of the vehicles used were provided by the Pakistani military and it took over an hour before all the American personnel were secure within the British Embassy. The FSNs made their own way to their homes.

Upon arriving at the British Embassy, the Americans were met by Ambassador Hummel who had moved from the Foreign Ministry to the British Embassy as soon as the vault evacuation was completed. Efforts commenced immediately to insure that all U.S. personnel had been accounted for including those persons who had been removed from the compound earlier in the day by the Pakistani military and police forces or were otherwise separated from the main group. Ambassador Hummel reestablished telephone contact with Washington to assure the Department that the situation was under control.

The British Ambassador offered the evacuees the full hospitality of the British Embassy and provided food, drink, and a general feeling of warmth and safety. This was done at considerable risk to his mission as the security situation in Islamabad at that time was unclear. The State Department Operations Center was provided with the names of all personnel who had been accounted for up to that time. The Office of Security was given a report on the amount of classified material that remained in the chancery and arrangements were made for the protection of the chancery grounds until all classified material could be destroyed. Corporal Crowley's body was placed in a casket provided by the British Embassy and then transported to the AID Commissary for storage. All the evacuees remained in the British Embassy until the Pakistani military authorities had provided assurances that they could be safely escorted to their homes. This was done in the early hours of the morning of November 22.

SITUATION OUTSIDE THE CHANCERY BUILDING

By approximately 1340 hours, the mob was in complete control of the Embassy compound. During the afternoon, the mob increased from the original 500 to somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 demonstrators and spectators. Although the initial attack focused on the motorpool area and the main chancery building, other elements of the mob quickly spread throughout the compound attacking, burning and looting as they went. The American Club was the target of one such

tioned himself at the vault door during the initial stages of the attack to ensure that mission employees would be able to gain access and that the vault could be secured immediately if the third floor were penetrated by the attacking mob. At approximately 1320, after the demonstrators had initially overrun the police and contract guards on the compound, communications personnel began destroying classified material. This material was fed into a Model 1012 disintegrator and all of the highly sensitive material in the communications area was totally destroyed within one and a half hours from the time of the initial attack. Other classified records from the file room area of the vault were destroyed by 1430. This delay was caused by the post's inability to use additional destruction devices *located in a room* off the outer vault due to smoke, intense heat, and tear gas seepage. No classified material was compromised during the attack since, in addition to those highly sensitive materials which were destroyed, all other materials remained secured in safe file cabinets.

ESCAPE FROM THE VAULT

As the afternoon progressed, the situation in the vault became significantly worse. The intense heat, smoke, and tear gas, as well as the rapid oxygen depletion, were having a serious effect on the people in the vault. At approximately 1745, the carpet began smouldering from the intense heat and the floor tiles began to peel. A fire extinguisher was used to douse the carpet.

During the attack and throughout most of the afternoon, communication with Ambassador Hummel and others outside the compound continued via VHF radio. Details of the situation in the vault had been transmitted to the Ambassador who was extending all efforts to obtain a relief force from the Pakistan Government and at the same time keeping the Department informed of the situation. The efforts of the Ambassador and others to obtain assistance were augmented by members of the Canadian and British Embassies. Additional information concerning the activities of the mob and the lack of response by the Pakistani military was transmitted from the Canadian compound. From approximately 1410, RSS Kelly, Consular Officer Bowen and Mrs. Tripett, wife of State Department employee Frank Tripett, had been monitoring the communications from the vault area at a nearby residence. They established phone contact with U.S. Consul General in Karachi and requested be initiate telegraphic contact with the Department. The ConGen sent a number of FLASH messages to the Department indicating the critical situation at the Embassy and the desperate situation of the persons in the vault.

Ambassador Hummel had frequent contacts with senior members of the Pakistani Government in an attempt to obtain a military relief force for the compound. He spoke with President Zia on several occasions and on each occasion was assured that military help was either on the way or had already arrived.

From approximately 1430 until 1700, two Pakistani military helicopters circled the compound and made passes at the demonstrators on the roof. The helicopters did not attempt to land a rescue force on the roof and were not a very effective means of crowd control. For example, on several occasions, the Pakistan Government assured the Ambassador that the chancery roof area had been cleared of hostile elements. In each instance, this turned out to be false.

At approximately 1530, on the advice of the RSS, the Ambassador moved from his residence, which was the next likely target of attack, to the Foreign Ministry. During the next three hours at the Foreign Ministry, time and time again he implored Pakistani authorities at the highest level to initiate an appropriate rescue action. Repeatedly, he was assured that rescue was on the way but no concrete response materialized at the Embassy site. In these efforts, the Ambassador was supported by Deputy Chief of Mission Barry King who had been at the Foreign Ministry for most of the afternoon attempting to obtain GOP assistance.

At approximately 1730 hours, the NCOI was directed by Admin Counselor Fields to take a small force and attempt to clear an escape route from the third floor vault area to the ground floor. He was told to use force, as necessary, to clear the area. The NCOIC, two MSGs, and two DEA agents left the vault and attempted to traverse the third floor from the southeast corner to northwest stairwell, where egress from the building would be possible using the emergency exit on the ground floor. The fire and smoke, however, were so intense that they were forced to return to the vault.

Up until approximately 1800 hours, the demonstrators had been highly visible on the roof and their presence was being reported by observers at the Canadian compound. During the afternoon, they had attempted to force open the emergenc

By approximately 1400, all employees except the internal defense force located in the lobby had retreated to the third floor vault area. The NCOIC then directed the two DEA agents to deploy to the third floor central staircase entrance door and secure that area. He also requested the MSGs to check and ensure that the staircases on both ends of the building were secured, which they did.

While the internal defense team held the second floor, the attackers began vandalizing and setting fire to the ground floor. As the fires spread throughout the lower floor of the building, the heat increased in intensity and the second floor area become uninhabitable. Smoke and tear gas filled the hallways and it became extremely difficult for the internal force to see, communicate and remain operational. There still had not been any direct physical contact between the internal defense force and the demonstrators although the demonstrators had attempted to come up the ground floor staircase. The internal defense force responded by throwing tear gas canisters under the fire door and down into the ground floor area below.

At about 1445, the internal defense force was forced to give up the second floor due to smoke and heat and withdrew to the third floor vault. By this time, almost all Embassy staff who had been in the building at the time of the attack were secure in the vault area. Notable exceptions were several FSNs and an FBO third country national contract employee who were caught in the attack on the ground floor. The FBO man and two FSNs escaped by jumping to safety through open windows. The burned bodies of two other FSNs were discovered the day after the attack during an inspection of the chancery.

SITUATION IN THE VAULT

The vault was located at the extreme southeast end of the third floor and was composed of several separate communications rooms plus an area that housed the incinerator and a small bathroom. Entrance to the vault was through a Mosler Class 6 vault door into what was referred to as the outer vault.

Of the 137 occupants of the vault, all were Embassy employees or dependents with the exception of a female Time Magazine correspondent. Most of these people, including all the FSN employees, were located in the file room of the vault.

Once the vault door was secured, the defense force assumed posts in the outer vault near the door. Their assignment was to prevent any attempted forced entry from the third floor hallway into the vault. The attackers, by this time, had obtained access and control of the chancery roof, including the area directly above the vault. Initially, they had climbed the flag pole next to the chancery building and by the use of the flag pole rope were able to swing to the auditorium roof and from there, ascend to the chancery roof. Once on the roof, they smashed the communication antennas, threw the emergency destruction barrels off the roof and attempted to force open the emergency escape hatch leading from the roof to the vault.

In order to prevent this, the employees augmented the existing hatch security with wire, reinforcing the locking device to prevent the hatch from being forced open. Additionally, the NCOIC periodically threw tear gas canisters into the Model two incinerator which discharged the tear gas through the incinerator stack to the roof. This was effective initially in driving the demonstrators away from the escape hatch.

Both the American and FSN employees in the vault remained calm throughout their confinement. The FSNs were situated quietly seated on the file room floor while the Administrative Counsellor and other senior American officers and staff continually reassured them that all would be well. Other American employees manned radio and telephone equipment. Communication was maintained with Ambassador Hummel, who was at his residence, as well as with observers at the Canadian Embassy and the American School. At one point, the Embassy generator failed and all power was lost for approximately four minutes until the remotely activated emergency generator came on. All areas in the vault except the file room, where the majority of the employees were located, had emergency lighting; nevertheless, for those crammed in the file room, the temporary darkness created a very tense situation. Moreover, the vault area was becoming intensely hot and unbearable due to the seepage in of smoke and tear gas.

DISPOSITION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Immediately prior to vacating their offices and taking refuge in the vault, American employees had been instructed to secure all classified material in their safes. Without exception, this was done. The communications supervisor posi-

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that we talked to him several times and since he has expressed himself on the record on this issue, I think we can safely vote him as aye. He did vote live this morning.

Senator DODD. Senator Pressler also had a proxy against the sale as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Pressler also is against the sale. I think we can cast his vote also.

[Pause.]

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, are we still voting on the Pakistan sale?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, this is a resolution of disapproval.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Are we doing this again because of some confusion?

The CHAIRMAN. Because we did not have a live quorum present this morning.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I wish to be recorded as voting no.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Your vote, Senator Kassebaum, would make it nine nays.

If we add Senator Pressler's proxy, that would give us a tally of five yeas. We will add Senator Pell's nay vote, since he voted live this morning. That makes a total of six nays.

The vote is nine to six, then.

Senator Mathias had voted live this morning. He is in favor of the sale and voted against the resolution of disapproval. That makes a tally of 10 to 6.

One Senator, Senator Biden, has not yet cast a vote. He will be polled later this evening so that he can cast his vote.

* * * * * * *

Thank you all very much.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:42 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

○

In considering the Pakistan resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 48, a resolution of disapproval, a quorum was not present. We were one Senator shy, so I suggest we take that vote again. Is there anyone who wants to discuss it? We all know the issues.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. A no vote will be a vote in favor of the arms sale to Pakistan. An aye vote is a vote for disapproval of the sale.

The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Baker.

Mr. SANDERS. No, by proxy.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Helms.

Senator HELMS. No.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. No.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. No.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Mathias.

[No response.]

Mr. KEANEY. Mrs. Kassebaum.

[No response.]

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Boschwitz.

Mr. SANDERS. No, by proxy.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Pressler.

[No response.]

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Pell.

[No response.]

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Biden.

[No response.]

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Glenn.

Senator GLENN. No.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Aye.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. No.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Aye.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Cranston.

Senator DODD. Aye, by proxy.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Dodd.

Senator DODD. Aye.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

The vote is eight nays and four ayes. A quorum having been present, the motion of disapproval is voted down.

Senator Boschwitz, the motion on the resolution of disapproval on jet sales to Pakistan *was* just voted.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell is upstairs, and I do do not have a proxy for him. He did vote for the resolution of disapproval this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I recall that he voted in person this morning.

Senator DODD. I just wonder if this could be kept open. If we are going to move on to the next vote, he might be able to come down and record himself on this before *we* leave.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Yes, we have to vote again. We will physically have to have nine Senators in the room at the time we take the vote.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I would hope there would be a report issued on this as well.

The CHAIRMAN. We would have to take into account, Senator Pell, the time limitations.

Suppose we consult with the majority and minority leaders of the Senate at noon today on the time requirement and when they would have to take it up. We may be in session Saturday.

Senator PELL. The opposition side is prepared to file a report today.

The CHAIRMAN. You are?

Senator PELL. That's right. There will be no layover.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, fine. Let us have a decision on that at our next meeting, after the next vote.

Senator Mathias, would you like to discuss the Foreign Missions Act?

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, with Senator Sarbanes present we now have a quorum.

The CHAIRMAN. If Senator Sarbanes will cast his vote, then, this can be the final vote.

Senator SARBANES. Are we still being reported on that vote?

The CHAIRMAN. We are. We would be happy to reopen the ballot for you to cast your vote.

Senator Kassebaum has just left the room, but we are trying to recall her back for this.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Rather than to delay the committee at this stage because we are not quite sure where Senator Kassebaum is—and Senator Sarbanes, you may still cast your vote—it will still be necessary to have another vote in S–116, immediately following the next rollcall vote on the floor.

Senator SARBANES. I want to vote for the resolution of disapproval.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

That does not change the vote, however, because Senator Sarbanes' proxy was cast as in favor of the resolution. The vote is still five in favor of the resolution and nine opposed to the resolution.

We will revote on that later in room S–116.

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This meeting will be recessed until this afternoon, when we will meet in room S–116, of the Capitol.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene in room S–116, the Capitol, later the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

[Whereupon, at 6:22 p.m., the committee reconvened in room S–116, the Capitol.]

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we can wrap up our remaining business in just a few minutes.

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Senator HAYAKAWA. No.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Lugar.
Senator LUGAR. No.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. No.
Mr. KEANEY. Mrs. Kassebaum.
Senator KASSEBAUM. No.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Boschwitz.
Mr. SANDERS. No, by proxy.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Pressler.
Mr. SANDERS. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Pell.
Senator PELL. Aye.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Biden.
[No response.]
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Glenn.
[No response.]
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Sarbanes.
Senator PELL. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Zorinsky.
Senator ZORINSKY. No.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Tsongas.
[No response.]
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Cranston.
Senator PELL. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Dodd.
Senator DODD. Aye.
Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire as to what the proper status of this vote is?

As I understand it, proxies cannot be used to change the outcome of the vote? Or does the vote remain open until we meet in S–116? Is this the final vote?

What is the actual status?

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that we do not have nine Members physically in the room, we will ratify the vote when we do have nine Senators physically in the room. The next attempt to do that will be immediately after the next floor vote, and that will be done in room S–116.

Senator DODD. How can you ratify a vote that is not proper since there is not a quorum?

Senator MATHIAS. Nunc pro tunc.

Senator DODD. If there is not a quorum, the vote is not official.

The CHAIRMAN. This vote, if sent to the floor this way, could be challenged on a point of order because we physically do not have the quorum.

Senator DODD. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. But this at least gives us an indication that nine Senators, by proxy or in person, have cast their votes against the resolution of disapproval and five Senators are in favor of it.

Senator DODD. In effect, what we have to do is to vote over again, then?

For those reasons, I will support this sale.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, I think both the Senator from Kansas and the Senator from Connecticut have stated the case very well. This traffic in arms around the world has reached a volume which is truly frightening. It threatens not only the peace of the world, but it threatens the economy of the world by the sheer magnitude of the resources that are being diverted from human needs into the arms traffic.

While they agree on the problem, they have come up with the opposite answers.

The problem has reached the point where it would be rational for a U.S. Senator simply to say, "I will never again approve any arms sale that is submitted to the Senate for review." I think the problem is very close to that point. I have considered the possibility that we should have a blanket position of no arms to Saudi Arabia, no arms to Jordan, no arms to Israel, no arms to anybody—that the time has come to put a stop to this.

Unfortunately, as the chairman points out, we are not the only actors here. We are not the only merchants in the marketplace.

I think it becomes very hard for us to take that position while there are so many other sources. I think it is a position which we ought to consider.

Meanwhile, in answer to the Senator from Connecticut, there are signs that a strategy is developing, that a strategy is forming. The administration has had less than 1 year in which to develop that strategy. After all, 1 year in the long reach of history is not very long.

On the assumption that that strategy is being formulated, I would support this sale.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mathias.

Are we ready for a vote?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. We are ready. The clerk will call the roll.

Because we do not have physically in the room a quorum on this vote, I would like to take the vote now, but also would ask that Senators, after the next vote, meet in S-116, in the Capitol, to ratify the vote and also to act on subsequent resolutions that will come before us.

Let us have a rollcall now.

Senator DODD. After the next vote, would we go to the Capitol?

The CHAIRMAN. After the next vote, we would meet in room S-116. I presume there would be no vote on the floor until 2 o'clock because of policy meetings during the lunch hour. Let me state that a nay vote is supportive of the sale, as proposed by the administration. An aye vote is in opposition to the sale of F-16's to Pakistan.

Will the clerk recall the roll.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Baker.

Mr. SANDERS. No, by proxy.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Helms.

Mr. SANDERS. No, by proxy.

Mr. KEANEY. Mr. Hayakawa.